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Case No. 20061025-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT

State of Utah,
Plaintifi7Appellee,
vs.

Douglas A. Lovell,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea to
aggravated murder, a capital felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §
78A-3-102(3)(i) (West Supp. 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did Lovell show "good cause" to withdraw his guilty plea, where the plea-taking
court strictly complied with rule 11 and where, in any event, he was not harmed by any
alleged rule 11 violation?
Standard of Review. The denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, \ 10,983 P.2d 556. A trial court's
supporting factual findings are reviewed for clear error. State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 9,22
P.3d 1242. Whether a trial court strictly complied with rule 11 is a question of law, reviewed
for correctness. Id.

2. Has Lovell shown that the 23B court committed plain error in not sua sponte
concluding that his state due process rights were violated during the plea process, where no
governing law so held and where Lovell has shown no prejudice?
Standard of Review. Unpreserved claims, even constitutional ones, will be reviewed
on appeal only for plain error. State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, % 13, 95 P.3d 276.
3. Did the 23B court clearly err in finding that Lovell9s plea counsel performed
objectively reasonably during the plea process and that any alleged deficient performance did
not prejudice Lovell?
Standard of Review. A trial court's pure factualfindingson an ineffective assistance
claim are reviewed for clear error; its application of the law to the facts is reviewed for
correctness. Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, ^ 9, 165 P.3d 1195.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes and rules are included in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1995);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004);
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(2008).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is Lovell's third direct appeal. On June 28, 1993, he pled guilty to aggravated
murder, admitting that he had intentionally or knowingly killed Joyce Yost to prevent her
from testifying against him in a kidnapping and sexual assault trial. R681-82. Lovell
waived his right to a sentencing jury and, after a full penalty phase, the trial court sentenced
him to death. R232, 356-70, 656, 665-66, 669, 690-93, 706-1315.

2

First direct appeal LovelPs attorney filed the first notice of appeal within two weeks
of the death sentence. R3 81. The next day, the trial court received a handwritten letter from
Lovell asking to withdraw his plea because he had "wanted all along to have a jury hear the
penalty hearing." R383. Lovell wrote that he had agreed to waive a sentencing jury only
when his attorney said he "dou[b]ted" that the trial court "would or could give [Lovell] the
death penalty." Lovell also wrote there were "other reasons also," but did not elaborate. Id.
The trial court did not rule on the pro se motion to withdraw the plea because defense
counsel argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction while Lovell's direct appeal was
pending. R1397; R2242:4-5. During the first direct appeal, this Court remanded under rule
23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing
and to make findings regarding LovelPs claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The
order of remand did not include LovelPs pro se motion to withdraw his plea. R1410.
Throughout the remainder of the appeal, neither party raised, and this Court did not address,
LovelPs motion to withdraw his pleas. State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, \ 1, 984 P.2d 382
("Lovelll"). This Court affirmed LovelPs sentence on the first direct appeal. Id.
Second direct appeal Nearly two years after the first direct appeal, Lovell, through
new counsel, filed a Renewed Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. R1827. The renewed
motion alleged that Lovell should be allowed to withdraw his plea, not because he had
wanted a jury during the penalty phase, but because the plea-taking court had not strictly
complied with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rl 827-29. The State moved to
dismiss both the original pro se and the renewed motions to withdraw, primarily because

3

they were both untimely under then-governing law, and the trial court therefore lacked
jurisdiction to entertain them. R2146-61.
The trial court agreed and dismissed both motions as untimely. But on the second
direct appeal, this Court reversed, holding that, based on an intervening change in the law,
LovelPs/?ro se motion to withdraw was timely and still pending. R2232-35; State v. Lovell,
2005 UT 31,114 P.3d 575 ("Lovell II"). This Court remanded under rule 23B for the trial
court to rule on LovelPs motions to withdraw his guilty plea. Id
This appeal In November 2005, the 23B court held a three-day evidentiary hearing
on both LovelPs motions to withdraw his plea. R2995-97. After taking testimony,
reviewing extensive post-hearing briefing, and hearing argument, the 23B court denied
Lovell's motions in a detailed memorandum decision. R2922-74, addendum B. The 23B
court concluded that the plea court had strictly complied with rule 11 and that Lovell was not
prejudiced even if there had been a rule violation. R2935-45. The 23B court also concluded
that Lovell's plea counsel was not ineffective during the plea process. R2951-70.
In this appeal, Lovell timely appeals the denial of his motions to withdraw.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Twenty-three years ago, Lovell twice kidnapped Joyce Yost from her home: the first
time to rape and sodomize her; the second to murder her for reporting the sexual attacks and
to prevent her from testifying about them at trial. See generally Lovell /, 1999 UT 40; R281,
529-37,711-13,728,735-36,760-62,767-68,770-78,782-98,806-08,830-32,837,841-42,
852-53,859,864,884,914,923,1150,1178-81,1190,1192-95,1200-06,1214-17,1227-40.
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The murder
In April 1985, Lovell followed Ms. Yost home, kidnapped her, and took her to his
home where he repeatedly raped and sodomized her. R1181, 1206, 1212, 1214-15. Ms.
Yost reported the attack, and Lovell was charged with aggravated kidnapping and aggravated
sexual assault. R474, 676-77, 711, 713.
Before the preliminary hearing, Lovell hired two men to kill Ms. Yost. Both took his
money, but neither followed through. R728,761-62,767-68,770-78,788-89,837,841,859,
864, 866-67,1178-79, 1190, 1192-95, 1200-05, 1240.
After Ms. Yost testified at the preliminary hearing, Lovell kidnapped and murdered
her himself. Lovell's wife, Rhonda Buttars, dropped him off at Ms. Yost's home, where he
broke in through an unlocked kitchen window. Lovell packed a suitcase to make it look as if
Ms. Yost had left of her own accord. Lovell then drove Ms. Yost in her car to a canyon
outside Ogden where he strangled her. Lovell covered her body with leaves and left her on
the mountainside. But about a month later, Lovell took a shovel to the murder site, where,
after taking Ms. Yost's watch, he buried her body. R711-13, 735-36, 761-62,767, 770-75,
778, 788-89, 791-92, 797-98, 806-08, 832, 837, 841-42, 852, 859, 864, 866-67, 883, 914,
923, 1150, 1178-79, 1190, 1200-04, 1216, 1232-35, 1237-40.
When Ms. Yost could not be found, her preliminary hearing testimony was admitted
at trial. Lovell was convicted. R712-13, 852-53.
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Lovell confesses on tape
Nearly six years after the murder, Lovell's mother died. Detective Terry Carpenter
hoped that this would prompt Lovell to reveal the location of Ms. Yost's body. But when
Carpenter visited Lovell in prison for this purpose, Lovell said, "F*** you. I don't have
anything to say to you." R477,479,481-84, 505-06,511-12,539, 543-44, 548-523 900-01.
Carpenter then interviewed Rhonda Buttars, who by then had divorced Lovell.
Buttars gave Carpenter a statement about Ms. Yost's death that included non-public details.
R519, 537, 537A, 539A, 750, 752-53.
Buttars knew that Lovell had killed Ms. Yost. She had heard him negotiate the
contracts to kill Ms. Yost, had driven him to Ms. Yost's home the night of the murder and on
a prior night when he went to look for a way in, had met him the morning after the murder
when he abandoned Ms. Yost's car, had driven him to a camp site where he burned Ms.
Yost's clothing, and had accompanied him when he tried to pawn Ms. Yost's watch. R761813,832-84.
After Carpenter's contact, Lovell asked Buttars to visit him in prison. She did so in
June 1991 and January 1992. Both times she wore a recording device; both times Lovell
admitted killing Ms. Yost. Lovell speculated that the men he hired to kill Ms. Yost might
have given police information about the murder:
Billy doesn't know that I did it. Billy doesn't know, neither does Tom.
Nobody knows. You [referring to Buttars] was the only one. You're the only
one that can get on the stand and say, "that's him."
R896. Lovell also expressed concern that he could get the death penalty for the murder:
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I committed a first degree felony to cover another felony. It's the death
penalty. At the very least they're going to give me life without parole. If I
cooperate with them and go to them, they're going to give me life without
parole.
* * * *

I premeditated - premeditated. I planned to kill Joyce. I planned to end
Joyce's life. That's premeditated capital homicide.
R897-98.
Lovell pleads guilty on the day set for trial
After obtaining these statements, the State charged Lovell with aggravated kidnapping
and aggravated murder. Rl-4. Lovell's attorney, John Caine, moved to suppress the
recorded statements to Buttars. R80. The trial court denied the motion and this Court denied
Lovell's ensuing petition for interlocutory review. Rl 16,160-62, 166, 185.
Subsequently, on June 17,1993, the parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding
("June Memorandum"). R244-46. The June Memorandum required Lovell to produce Ms.
Yost's identifiable remains, plead guilty to capital murder, and agree to a sentence of life
without the possibility of parole. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the aggravated
kidnapping charge and to a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. R245-46. The
June Memorandum provided, however, that Lovell's failure to produce Ms. Yost's remains
would "render this agreement null and void and the capital murder and kidnapping trial
[then] set for June 28, 1993 [would] proceed as scheduled with no negotiations or
agreements between the [parties] in the guilt and/or sentencing phases of said trial." R245.
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Lovell did not lead police to Ms. Yost's body. Thus, the June Memorandum was
voided by its own terms. R244-46,657-58. Nevertheless, on June 28,1993, the day set for
trial to begin, Lovell pled guilty to aggravated murder. R190, 656-94.
The plea hearing
The "idea" of pleading guilty "originated with the defendant" and "really [was] not a
plea negotiation." R658. Lovell told the trial court that he had "pretty much wanted to do
exactly this for a long time." R665. His attorney explained that he and Lovell began "to
have some serious discussions" about pleading guilty after they had exhausted their attempts
to suppress Lovell's "extraordinarily damaging" taped admissions to Buttars. R663-64.
Counsel explained that Lovell also wanted to plead guilty because "he wanted to make a
clean breast of this," and end the matter "so that neither his family or the family of the victim
would have to go through a protracted trial." R663-64.
Counsel stressed that pleading guilty was Lovell's decision: "At the same time he has
concluded on his own and communicated to me on numerous occasions at the state prison or
where we visited here that he did not want to go through with the trial process and didn't
want to have that happen, given all the circumstances

" R665. Counsel represented that

he and Lovell had had "ample time to discuss" the plea and that Lovell "has been steadfast in
what he wanted to do, at least for the last three or four months, and has been unwavering in
that attitude." Id. Lovell agreed with his counsel's representations. Id. Lovell also elected
to be sentenced under a new statute providing for three sentencing options—death, life
without parole, or life—and he waived his right to a sentencing jury. R656.
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Although Lovell had decided to plead guilty without an agreement, the State
nevertheless agreed to dismiss the aggravated kidnapping count. R658. There was "no other
part to the negotiation." R656. The State also agreed to still recommend life without the
possibility of parole if Lovell managed to lead police to Ms, Yost's remains before the
sentencing hearing began. R697-99. To that end, the parties agreed to continue the
sentencing hearing to July 29, 1993. Id.
The written plea statement

Before the plea hearing, Lovell executed a written

statement in advance of plea. R237-42. The written plea statement certified that Lovell
knew of various constitutional rights that he would be waiving by pleading guilty, including:
(1) the right to a jury trial; (2) the right "to see and observe the witnesses who testify against
me"; (3) the right to have his attorney "cross-examine all witnesses who testify against me";
(4) the right to "call such witnesses as I desire" and to "obtain subpoenas to require the
attendance and testimony of these witnesses"; (5) the right against self-incrimination; (6) and
the right to require the "government [to] prove each and every element of the offenses
charged against me beyond a reasonable doubt." R239. The plea statement also set forth the
elements and minimum and maximum penalties for aggravated murder. R238, 240.
The plea statement informed Lovell of the time for moving to withdraw his plea and
that such a motion would be granted only "upon good cause." R241.
The plea colloquy. The trial court engaged Lovell in a thorough plea colloquy, which
referenced the written plea statement. R655-94. The trial court addressed the elements of
aggravated murder, made sure that Lovell understood the minimum-maximum penalties for
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that charge, and personally advised Lovell three times that by pleading guilty he was "giving
up certain constitutional rights," including: (1) to have a unanimous jury decide whether he
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and to decide his sentence; (2) "to confront witnesses,
to see who they are, to hear what they have to say and ask them questions, having them take
the stand and testify"; (3) the right "to require that the state prove that you're guilty beyond
any reasonable doubt"; (4) and the "right to remain silent." R666-68, 671-72, 679-81.
After Lovell pled guilty to aggravated murder, the trial court stated that it "accepts
your plea and enters conviction." R682.
The trial court and parties then discussed when to schedule the penalty hearing and
the trial court took LovelPs waiver on a sentencing jury. R683-88. At that point, the
prosecutor asked the trial court to incorporate the written plea statement by making sure, on
the record, that Lovell had read and understood his written statement in advance of plea.
R689. Lovell said that he had "just read" the plea statement and that he "fully" understood
it. R689-90. He also confirmed that he had gone over the statement "item by item" with his
attorney, who explained it to him. Id. Lovell had no further questions about the plea
statement and his attorney certified that Lovell understood "each" of the statement's
provisions. Id.
Additional relevant facts are in the argument section.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: The 23B court correctly concluded that Lovell had not shown good cause for
withdrawing his plea. First, the 23B correctly concluded that the plea court strictly complied
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with rule 11. In reaching that conclusion, the 23B court properly relied on the plea colloquy,
the written plea statement, and other record facts, including Lovell's prior trial experience.
Second, even assuming non-strict rule 11 compliance, the 23B court correctly concluded that
Lovell had not shown good cause to withdraw his plea where any violation was clearly
harmless.
Since adopting strict rule 11 compliance in Gibbons, this Court has not applied
harmless error review to preserved technical rule 11 violations on direct appeal. But it also
has not foreclosed it. Before Gibbons, this Court expressly held that harmless error review
applies to technical rule 11 violations. Nothing in Gibbons purported to overrule that
decision. Indeed, since Gibbons, this Court has amended rule 11 to expressly provide for
harmless error review of technical rule 11 violations. This Court has also held that a
defendant must show harm when an alleged rule violation is unpreserved and raised under
plain error review.
The time has come for this Court to hold, like the majority of jurisdictions, that
harmless error review applies to preserved claims of alleged rule 11 violations on direct
appeal. Doing so will not undermine strict rule 11 compliance. It will, however, promote
efficiency and fairness by not undoing knowing and voluntary guilty pleas based on harmless
technical rule violations.
Point II: Lovell contends for the first time on appeal that his plea was taken in
violation of his due process rights under the Utah Constitution. He therefore seeks review of
this claim under plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. Lovell has not shown
obvious error or deficient performance where no governing law at the time he pled guilty
11

held that failure to advise him of rule 11 rights amounted to a state due process violation.
He also has not shown prejudice—i.e., that but for the alleged errors, he would not have pled
guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial.
Point III: This Court should not reach Lovell's inadequately briefed ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. In any event, he has not shown that the 23B court's finding
that his counsel was effective was clearly erroneous. He also has not shown prejudice where
his counsel's claimed errors were unrelated to his reasons for pleading guilty.
ARGUMENT
I.
LOVELL HAS NOT SHOWN GOOD CAUSE FOR WITHDRAWING
HIS GUILTY PLEA WHERE THE PLEA-TAKING COURT
STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH RULE 11 AND WHERE, IN ANY
EVENT, HE WAS NOT HARMED BY ANY ALLEGED RULE
VIOLATION1
Lovell argues that the 23B court erred in concluding that the plea court did not strictly
comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Br. Aplt. 21-41. Rule 11(e)
provides that a trial court "may not accept [a guilty] plea until the court has found/' that:
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence,
the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public
trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open
court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived.
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3). Lovell asserts that the plea court failed to ascertain that he was
aware of the right (1) to the presumption of innocence; (2) to compel the attendance of
defense witnesses; (3) to a speedy, public trial before an impartial jury; and (4) against
1

This point responds to Point I, pages 21-41, and Point III, pages 36-48, of Lovell's

brief.
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compulsory self-incrimination. Br. Aplt. 27, 34-41. Lovell contends that the plea court
further violated rule 11 by not informing him of the minimum and maximum penalties of his
crime; the right to require the prosecution to prove each element of his crime beyond a
reasonable doubt; and the right to be informed of the State's burden of proof in a capital
sentencing hearing. Id. (citing Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(A) & (e)(5)).
Lovell also argues that the 23B court erred in concluding that any rule 11 violation
was harmless. Br. Aplt. 49-51. Lovell contends that a trial court's failure to strictly comply
with rule 11 is per se prejudicial and that harmless error review is therefore inapplicable. Id.
As explained below, the 23B court correctly concluded that Lovell had not shown
good cause for withdrawing his plea. First, the 23B court correctly concluded—after
properly considering the plea colloquy, the written plea statement, and other record
facts—that the plea court had strictly complied with rule 11. Second, the 23B court correctly
concluded that none of the alleged rule 11 violations was harmful where the record showed
that Lovell would have pled guilty despite the alleged errors. Accordingly, the 23B court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the motions to withdraw.
A. Lovell has not shown good cause for withdrawing his plea where the pleataking court strictly complied with rule 11.
"A 'withdrawal of a plea of guilty is a privilege, not a right. . . [and] is within the
sound discretion of the trial court.'" State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, \ 9, 1 P.3d 1108
(quoting State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1987)). While the entry of pleas is
governed by rule 11, the privilege of withdrawing them is governed by statute. See Utah
Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004). At the time Lovell pled guilty, Utah's plea withdrawal
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statute provided that a guilty plea could be withdrawn only "upon good cause shown and
with leave of the court." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (1995).
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that failure to strictly comply with rule 11
constitutes "good cause" to withdraw a plea as a matter of law. See, e.g., State v. Mills, 898
P.2d 819, 821-22 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703,704 n.l (Utah App.
1994). While this Court has never expressly equated the two standards, it has stated that on a
direct appeal from the denial of a motion to withdraw, "'failure to strictly comply with [rule
11] would be grounds for reversal.5" Bluemel v. State, 2007 UT 90, % 18, 173 P.3d 842
(quoting Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 991 n.6 (Utah 1993)).
At first blush, the foregoing decisions appear to support Lovell's argument that a rule
11 violation, whether or not harmless, constitutes good cause for withdrawing a guilty plea.
But, as explained in Subpoint B, this Court has never expressly held or addressed whether a
harmless technical rule 11 violation constitutes statutory good cause. As argued below, this
Court should hold that a harmless rule violation is not good cause for withdrawing a plea.
But this Court need not reach the harmlessness issue if it concludes that the plea court
strictly complied with rule 11. As explained below, the plea court did.

In May 2003, the plea withdrawal statute was amended to remove the "good cause"
standard and to allow withdrawal of a plea "only upon leave of the court and a showing that
it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (West 2004).
According to this Court, "a violation of the prophylactic provisions of rule 11" is not the
same as showing that a "guilty plea was in fact not knowing and voluntary." Bluemel, 2007
UT 90, \ 18. See also Salazar, 852 P.2d at 991. Thus, even if a technical rule 11 violation
constituted "good cause" under the former version of the statute, it does not meet the new
requirement of the statute of showing that the plea "was not knowingly and voluntarily
made." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (West 2004).
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1. As is the case here, strict rule 11 compliance can be accomplished by
multiple means, including a plea colloquy, a written plea statement,
other record documents, and a defendant's personal trial experience.
As stated, rule 11 provides that a trial court may not accept a plea without first finding
that the defendant is aware of certain constitutional rights and that by pleading guilty he is
waiving those rights. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3). "[T]he substantive goal of rule 11 is to
ensure that defendants know of their rights and thereby understand the basic consequences of
their decision to plead guilty." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, Tf 11,22 P.3d 1242. To that end,
this Court has "placed the burden of complying with rule 11(e) on the district courts,
requiring them to 'personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and
voluntary and establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived his or her
constitutional rights.'" State v. Corwell, 2005 UT 28, f 11, 114 P.3d 569 (quoting Visser,
2000 UT 88, Tf 11). That burden has been described "as a duty of 'strict' compliance." Id
(quoting Visser, 2000 UT 88, ^f 11) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Rule 11 's primary concern is not so much what the plea court says to a defendant, but
whether the defendant in fact understands the rights he is waiving by pleading guilty. Thus,
the focus of rule 11 is on what in the record before the plea court supports a rule 11 finding
that defendant "knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights." Id
That substantive goal "should not be overshadowed or undermined by formalistic
ritual." Visser, 2000 UT 88,111. Thus, while "the phrase [strict compliance] might suggest

For purposes of this appeal only, the State agrees that the new version of the statute
does not apply to Lovell. Thus, this Court need not reach Lovell's claim that the "good
cause" and "knowing and voluntary" standards are both satisfied by a technical rule 11
violation. See Br. Aplt 23-24.
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otherwise," Corwell, 2005 UT 28, f 12, it "does not mandate a particular script or rote
recitation of the rights listed" in rule 11. Visser, 2000 UT 88, \ 11. Nor does strict
compliance require a court to use any "'specific method of communicating the rights
enumerated by rule 11.'" Cornell, 2005 UT 28, f 12 (quoting Visser 2000 UT 88, f 13). It
requires only that the plea court find that a defendant "had a conceptual understanding of
each of the elements of rule 11(e)." Cornell, 2005 UT 28,118.
A trial court's findings of a defendant's conceptual understanding "may be based on
questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting these
factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and
acknowledged the contents of the statement." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(8). See also State v.
Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 1991). But while a plea colloquy and written plea
affidavit may be the usual means for ascertaining that a defendant understands his rule 11
rights, they are not the only means. See Visser, 2000 UT 88,112; Maguire, 830 P.2d at 218.
Rule 11 is "stated permissively and thus does not prevent a court from taking into account
other record factors in making its findings." Visser, 2000 UT 88, % 12. Thus, this Court has
approved a plea court's taking into account a defendant's personal trial experience. Visser,
2000 UT 88, Tf 13 (in context of mid-trial plea, defendant's personal trial experience
"communicated at least as much as would the mere oral recitation of the 'right to a speedy
public trial before an impartial jury'"); Corwell, 2005 UT28,1fl[ 18-19 (that defendant had
"adequate conceptual understanding" of speedy trial right supported by record fact that trial
scheduled to begin next business day).
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2. The 23B court properly considered the written plea statement and
other record facts, including Lovell's personal trial experience.
Based on the foregoing authority, the 23B court relied on the plea hearing, the written
plea statement, and other record facts, including LovelPs prior personal trial experience, in
finding strict rule 11 compliance. Lovell nevertheless argues that the 23B Court "did not
properly limit its strict compliance review to the plea hearing record," in two respects. First,
he argues—for the first time on appeal—that his written plea statement may not be
considered because, although it was addressed during the plea hearing, the court did not ask
him if he understood it until after he pled guilty. Br. Aplt. 31-32. Second, he argues—again
for the first time on appeal—that his prior criminal trial experience should not have been
considered because it was "not discussed in the record of the plea hearing." Id. at 30.
a.

The written plea statement could be considered in
determining strict rule 11 compliance where it was properly
incorporated.

As stated, a trial court may base its rule 11 findings on a written statement "after the
court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents
of the statement." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(8). This is called "incorporating" the written
statement into the record: "When plea affidavits are properly incorporated in the record (as
when the trial judge ascertains in the plea colloquy that the defendant has read, has
understood, and acknowledges all the information contained therein), they may properly
form a part of the basis for finding rule 11 compliance." Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217
(emphasis added).
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Here, the plea court ascertained "in the plea colloquy" that Lovell had read,
understood, and acknowledged his written plea statement. Before taking Lovell9s plea, the
court ascertained that Lovell had read, signed, and discussed it with his attorney. R669.
Then, shortly after accepting the plea, the court—at the prosecutor's request—asked Lovell
whether he had read and understood his written statement. R689-90. Lovell responded that
he had "just read" the plea statement and that he "fully" understood "each" of its provisions.
Id. Lovell also told the court that he had reviewed the statement "item by item" with his
attorney, who had explained it to him. Id. Lovell had no questions about his statement. Id.
Lovell nevertheless asserts that his written plea statement was not properly
incorporated into the record, because although the plea court had previously ascertained that
he had read and discussed the statement with his attorney, it waited until after he pled to ask
whether he understood'the statement. Lovell contends that because incorporation occurred
after he pled guilty, the plea court should have "ultimately [gone] back over the rights
contained in the affidavit" and again asked him for his plea. Br. Aplt. 32-33.
Lovell did not make this argument below. He may therefore succeed on appeal only
if he establishes plain error, by showing that: (1) it was error to incorporate the written plea
statement shortly after accepting the plea; (2) any error was obvious such that the 2 3B court
should have recognized, absent objection, that it could not rely on the written plea statement;
and (3) there was a reasonable probability that Lovell would not have pled guilty if the
statement had been incorporated before accepting the plea, instead of shortly after. See State
v. Kelt, 2002 UT 106, \ 32, 61 P.3d 1019 (unpreserved arguments reviewed only for plain
error); State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63,ffif16-23, 95 P.3d 276 (in plain error challenge to guilty
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plea, defendant did not show obviousness where no settled appellate law to guide trial court
or prejudice in that but for the alleged error he would not have pled guilty).
Lovell does not acknowledge his plain error burden, let alone attempt to meet it. That
is reason alone to reject this claim. See State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7,fflf46-48,106 P.3d
734 (rejecting unpreserved constitutional claim where defendant did not argue plain error).
In any event, Lovell cannot satisfy the foregoing requirements.
No error. First, he has shown no error. Quoting State v. Gibbons, Lovell asserts,
"Strict compliance must be demonstrated, 'on the record before accepting the plea.'" Br.
Aplt. 32 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1314 (Utah 1987)).
But the quoted phrase from Gibbons— "on the record before accepting the guilty plea"—did
not purport to hold that a plea court could not correct a rule 11 omission once it had
"accepted" a defendant's plea. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1314. Indeed, this Court explained
after Gibbons that a plea statement is properly incorporated into the record "when the trial
judge ascertains in the plea colloquy that the defendant has read, has understood, and
acknowledges all the information contained therein." Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217 (emphasis
added). See also State v. Smith, 812 P.2d470,477 (Utah App. 1991) ("if an affidavit is used
to aid Rule 11 compliance, it must be addressed during the plea hearing") (emphasis added)
(quoted with approval in Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217).
Thus, nothing in this Court's precedents suggests that a plea affidavit may not be
considered in determining strict rule 11 compliance merely because the incorporation
happened shortly after, instead of before, the defendant announced his plea. If anything, the
cases demonstrate that rule 11 's concern is not the order in which the incorporation takes
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place, but that the incorporation be made manifest on the record. See Visser, 2000 UT 88, f
12 (strict compliance can be "accomplished by multiple means," so long as "no requirement
of the rule is omitted and so long as the record reflects that the requirement has been
fulfilled") (emphasis added); Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217 (strict compliance "may be
demonstrated on appeal by reference to the record of the plea proceedings) (emphasis
added). Here, the incorporation inquiry was clearly manifested on the record during the plea
hearing.
Even assuming that the plea statement should be incorporated before the court
"accepts the plea," the court did so in this case. Acceptance of a plea is not final at the
moment the court says that it "accepts" the plea. Rather, it is "subject to review up until the
time of sentencing." State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, \ 39,44 P.3d 756. See also State v. Ostler,
2001 UT 68, f 10,31 P.3d 528 ("it makes no sense to deprive the district court of the power
to review a plea before it enters a judgment of conviction and sentence"); State v. Lopez,
2005 UT App 496,ffif14-27, 128 P.3d 1 (allowing trial court to rescind oral acceptance of
plea before it entered written sentence). The acceptance of a plea, therefore, is not final until
entry of judgment. Thus, when the plea court here asked whether Lovell had read and
understood his written statement, the plea was not fully accepted, but was still in play.
Presumably, if Lovell had denied reading or understanding his written statement, the plea
court would—and should—have rescinded its oral acceptance of the plea.
At bottom, LovelPs argument seeks to "overshadow[]" and "undermine[] by
formalistic ritual" the "substantive goal" of rule 11: "to ensure that defendants know of their
rights and thereby understand the basic consequences of their" guilty pleas. Visser, 2000 UT
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88, % 11. But the incorporation rule is not an end in itself. Rather, it is merely a means for
achieving the larger goal in the plea process of assuring that a defendant knowingly pleads
guilty. See, e.g., Corwell, 2005 UT 28, f 21. LovelPs plea was not any less knowing merely
because his assurance on the record that he understood the written statement's contents came
shortly after, instead of before, the court said it had accepted the plea.
Any error was not obvious. Even assuming error, Lovell has not shown that it was
obvious. Lovell cites no case, and the State has found none, where this Court has held that
timing was critical to a plea statement's proper incorporation. See Dean, 2004 UT 63, l[fl[ 1621 (no obvious error absent settled law to guide trial court). Thus, the 23B court had no
reason to think that the written statement had not been properly incorporated and that it could
not, therefore, be relied on it in determining strict compliance. Nor did it have reason to
believe that once Lovell affirmed that he "fully" understood his plea statement, the plea court
had to "go back over the rights contained in the affidavit," and ask again for Lovell's plea.
See Br. Aplt. 33. This is especially true, not only where Lovell had already assured the plea
court that he had read the plea statement and thoroughly discussed it with his counsel, but
also where the court had already reviewed Lovell's constitutional rights with him three
times. SeeR656-94.
Prejudice. Finally, Lovell has not shown he was prejudiced by the timing of the
incorporation. When asked, Lovell said that he and his attorney had covered the plea
statement "item by item," that he "fully" understood it, and that he had no questions. R68990. Lovell has not argued that he would have said anything different or would not have pled
guilty if the plea court had solicited that information before orally accepting the plea.
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b.

Lovell's previous trial experience could properly be
considered in determining strict rule 11 compliance.

Lovell next challenges the 23B court's consideration of his "personal trial experience"
in assessing whether the plea court strictly complied with rule 11. See R2937-39. The 23B
court specifically looked to Lovell's extensive experience with the criminal justice system,
including his 1986 jury trial convicting him of kidnapping and sexually assaulting Ms. Yost.
Id. Lovell contends that the 23B court could not properly consider his "prior criminal trial
experience, not discussed in the record of the plea hearing, as a basis for finding that [he]
knew and understood each of his Rule 11 rights before waiving them." Br. Aplt. 30.
Because Lovell also raises this claim for the first time on appeal, he must both argue
and show obvious, prejudicial error. See Dean, 2004 UT 63,123. Because he has done
neither, this Court should not address this claim. See Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, ^[46-48. But
if it does, Lovell has not met his burden.
No error. Again, Lovell has shown no error. The 23B court concluded thai it could
rely on Lovell's personal trial experience based on this Court's decision in Visser. R2937.
Visser pled guilty mid-trial, but later moved to withdraw his plea under rule 11, bee ause the
trial court had not "specifically advise[d] him of his right to 'a speedy public trial before an
impartial jury.'" Visser, 2000 UT 88,ffi[3-4, 6. This Court held "that the trial court's
colloquy, in light of the mid-trial context of the plea, provided an adequate basis in the
record to conclude that the trial court strictly complied with rule 11." Id. at ^ 13.
This Court reasoned that "Visser's personal trial experience up to the point of his plea
agreement... communicated at least as much as would the mere oral recitation of the 'right
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to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury.55 Id. at \ 13. Because Visser5s trial had
already begun with no allegation that its commencement was untimely, "Visser had already
actually received the essential benefit of his right to a speedy trial.55 Id. at f 14. Thus,
reciting, "either orally or by affidavit, that Visser had the 'right to a speedy trial,5 would have
communicated no more than his actual trial experience to that point.55 Id at ^f 14.
Likewise, Visser, "by virtue of his actual trial experience, . . . had first-hand
knowledge of the method of ensuring the right to a trial by an impartial jury.55 Id. at ^f 16.
Visser was present during jury selection and "the experience of witnessing and participating
injury selection communicated the manner of providing an impartial jury in a more tangible
way than could mere words.55 Id. Visser5s personal trial experience, coupled with the trial
court's explanation that he had the right to continue with the trial and see it "conducted fairly
and properly,55 provided "adequate record support for the trial court's conclusion that Visser
knew of the right and understood that by pleading guilty he would waive it.55 Id. at Hf 16-17.
This Court in Corwell again relied on a defendant's personal trial experience to find
strict rule 11 compliance. Corwell pled guilty on the Friday before her scheduled Monday
trial. Corwell, 2006 UT 28, \ 3. Corwell signed a plea affidavit which omitted the right to a
speedy trial. Id. at ^[4. After incorporating the plea affidavit, the trial court engaged Corwell
in a plea colloquy in which Corwell affirmed that she wanted to give up her "right to have a
trial next Monday.55 Id. at If 5. Corwell unsuccessfully tried to withdraw her plea based on
the trial court's failure to inform her that she had the right to a "speedy" trial. Id. atffl[8,14.
On appeal, this Court reiterated that a defendant's "personal trial experience" was one
of many factors a trial court could consider in making rule 11 findings. Id. at \ 12 (citing
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Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 12).

While "the concepts embodied in rule 11(e) must be

communicated to the defendant before entering a guilty plea[,] . . . those concepts may be
communicated to the defendant in a variety of ways." Id at f 17. Again, the "test" for
finding rule 11 compliance is "whether the record adequately supports the district court's
conclusion that the defendant had a conceptual understanding of each of the elements of rule
11(e)." M a t f l 8 .
Just as it had in Visser, the Corwell Court found that the defendant's personal trial
experience adequately supported the conclusion that she had a conceptual understanding of
her right to a speedy trial:
In light of the fact that Corwell's trial was scheduled to begin just one
business day after the day on which she entered her plea, the district court's
repeated warning that Corwell's decision to plead guilty would result in her
giving up her "trial next Monday" communicated as much, if not more, about
the timing of Corwell's trial than would its use of the generic and abstract
phrase "speedy trial."
/</. atf 19.
Lovell correctly points out that both Visser and Corwell only involved personal trial
experience in the proceedings before the plea court. Br. Aplt. 30. But while neither case
involved "a defendant'sprior criminal trial experience," id., neither limited its holding to a
defendant's personal trial experience in the proceedings where he pleads guilty.
Nor does it appear that either case intended to so limit its holding. Both cases looked
to rule 11 's substantive goal of assuring that a plea court has an adequate basis to find that a
defendant knowingly pleads guilty. See Corwell, 2005 UT 28, U 11; Visser, 2000 UT 88, f
11. They thus stand for the proposition that the plea court may tailor the plea inquiry to what
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the court has a reasoned basis to conclude the defendant already knows. That the knowledge
derives from past rather than present trial experience makes no difference so long as the
record before the plea court supports concluding that the defendant already knows of certain
rights. LovelPs past trial experience is no less relevant to the validity of his plea than were
Visser's and Corwell's present trial experiences to the validity of their pleas.
The question then is whether Lovell's prior trial experience was apparent from the
record before the plea court. Lovell suggests that it was not apparent in the record because it
was "not discussed in the record of plea hearing." He therefore concludes that it could not be
used "as a basis for finding that [Lovell] knew and understood each of his Rule 11 rights
before waiving them." Br. Aplt. 30.
But the record shows that the plea court was well aware of Lovell's prior trial
experience, which included a jury trial on his charges for kidnapping and sexually assaulting
Joyce Yost. First, the fact that LovelPs prior sexual assault resulted from a trial was
addressed during the plea hearing. The plea court indicated that by pleading guilty, Lovell
would be admitting that he killed Ms. Yost to prevent her from testifying in the Davis
County rape trial. R659. In reciting the factual basis for the plea, Lovell's counsel explained
that the rape conviction resultedfroma trial at which the State used Ms. Yost's preliminary
hearing testimony to convict him. R676-78. In addition, several pre-trial pleadings
mentioned that Lovell's prior sexual assault conviction resultedfroma trial and at least one
mentioned that it resulted from a jury trial. See, e.g., R23, 81, 128, 167, 493.
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In sum, because the record shows that the plea court knew that Lovell had previously
been tried by a jury for prior crimes against Ms. Yost, the 23B court could properly consider
that experience in determining strict rule 11 compliance.
3. The plea colloquy, written plea statement, and other record facts,
including LovelPs personal trial experience, support the 23B court's
conclusion of strict rule 11 compliance.
Relying on the plea colloquy, the written plea statement, LovelPs personal trial
experience, and other record facts, the 23B court correctly concluded that the plea-taking
court strictly complied with rule 11.
Presumption of innocence. Lovell first claims that the plea court failed to ascertain
that he understood his right to the presumption of innocence. Br. Aplt. 34-37. He asserts
that the 23B court "conceded that both the plea agreement and plea colloquy were silent as to
the 'presumption of innocence'—a specific rule 11 right." Br. Aplt. 34 (citing R2937).
It is true that neither the plea colloquy nor the written plea statement uses the words
"presumption of innocence." See R657-94; R239-42. But rule 11 does not require the plea
court to use specific words in advising a defendant of his rights. It requires only that the plea
court find that the defendant had a "conceptual understanding" of his rights. Cornell, 2005
UT 28, TI18. The plea record here shows that when Lovell pled guilty, he had a conceptual
understanding of the presumption of innocence.
The presumption of innocence means "that a person may not be convicted of a crime
unless the government proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, without any burden placed on
the accused to prove innocence." Black's Law Dictionary 1225 (8th ed. 2004). See also
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (West 2004) ("Presumption of innocence - "Element of the
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offense" defined. "A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until
each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In
absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted."). That concept was repeatedly
conveyed to Lovell during the plea hearing. The plea court told Lovell three times that by
pleading guilty he was "giving up a right to require that the State prove that you're guilty
beyond any reasonable doubt." R666, 672, 680 (emphasis added). The only reasonable
inference from that statement is that the State had the sole burden of proving guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
LovelPs written plea also conveyed that concept: "I know that I have a right to plead
'not guilty,' and I know that if I do plead "not guilty," I can persist in that plea." R23 8. The
written plea statement further stated that Lovell knew that he had a right to a jury trial and
that if he were to exercise that right, the "government must prove each and every element of
the offenses charged against me beyond a reasonable doubt." R238-39.
Relying on Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895), Lovell argues that the
foregoing words were not enough to convey the concept of the presumption of innocence
because the presumption "is separate and distinct from the State's burden to prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt." Br. Aplt. 35. While it is true that the concepts are distinct, that
does not mean that the plea court's language did not accurately and adequately convey the
concept of the presumption of innocence. The Supreme Court in Coffin defined the
presumption of innocence as "a conclusion drawn by the law in favor of the citizen, by virtue
whereof, when brought to trial upon a criminal charge, he must be acquitted, unless he is
proven to be guilty." Coffin, 156 U.S. at 458-59. Moreover, as the Supreme Court later
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explained, the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard "provides concrete substance for
the presumption of innocence." In re Winship, 397 US. 358, 363 (1970).
The foregoing is just another way of saying that the presumption of innocence means
that a person may not be convicted of a crime unless the State proves guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. See also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501. That is precisely the concept
conveyed to Lovell when the plea court told him that he was giving up the right to' 'require55
the State to prove his guilt "beyond any reasonable doubt.55 R666,672,680. Indeed, the plea
court's iteration more clearly conveyed that concept than would have the words
"presumption of innocence.55 The court's phraseology clearly explained that the State was
required to prove Lovell5s guilt and that Lovell, therefore, did not have to prove his
innocence.3
In sum, the plea record shows that Lovell adequately understood his right to the
presumption of innocence before he pled guilty.

3

The 23B court also relied on Lovell5s previous trial experience in finding that the
plea court would have known that he had a conceptual understanding of the presumption of
innocence when he pled guilty: "[Hjaving been a defendant in two prior felony trials that
resulted in guilty jury verdicts, Lovell was certainly present when standard jury instructions
were presented explaining to jurors that he was presumed to be innocent of his alleged crime
until the jurors were persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty.55 R2938. It
was entirely permissible for the 23B court to rely on Lovell's previous trial experience
where, as stated, the plea court was well aware of that experience, and where going through
two jury trials would necessarily have taught Lovell the concept of the presumption of
innocence better than any words could have. See Corwell, 2005 UT 28, Tf 19; Visser, 2000
UT 88, f 13. But while appropriate, reliance on Lovell5s previous trial experience was
unnecessary where the plea colloquy and written statement clearly conveyed that concept.
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Right to compel witnesses. Lovell argues that the plea record does not show he was
adequately advised of the right to compel witnesses. Br. Aplt. 37. This claim, however, is
based on the assumption that Lovell's written plea statement may not be considered. See id.
But, as explained, the written plea statement was properly incorporated into the record
and therefore may be considered. According to the written plea statement, Lovell understood
that he had the right to compel witnesses if he decided not to plead guilty:
d.
I can call such witnesses as I desire, and I can obtain subpoenas to
require the attendance and testimony of those witnesses. If I cannot afford to
pay the witness and mileage fees of those witnesses, the government will pay
them.
R23 8. Lovell concedes that this "arguably" conveys the right to compel witnesses. Br. Aplt
37. In fact, it unambiguously and thoroughly conveys that right.4
Right to a speedyj public trial before an impartial jury. Lovell concedes that the
record showed he "knew he was entitled to a speedy trial since it was stated on the record
that it was scheduled to begin on the very day [he] entered his guilty plea." Br. Aplt. 38. See

4

Lovell correctly points out that the 23B court did not rely on the written statement in
concluding that he understood this right. Br. Aplt. 37. See R2938. Instead, the 23B court
relied on Lovell's prior trial experience and his counsel's representation during the plea
hearing that the defense "would be able to have our—the people that we would intend to call
[for the penalty hearing] at that point." R2938; R683. This Court need not address whether
these two things sufficiently showed strict rule 11 compliance, because the written plea
statement so clearly does. This Court may affirm on any alternative ground appearing in the
record. See Medel v. State, 2008 UT 32, \ 2, 184 P.3d 1226.
In any event, the 23B court's reliance on Lovell's prior trial experience and on
counsel's statement during the plea hearing was proper. Lovell's prior experience was
known to the plea court and it would have been reasonable for the court to conclude, based
on that experience, that Lovell was well aware of his right to compel witnesses. Counsel's
representation that they could have their witnesses at court on the scheduled sentencing date
only confirms that Lovell knew and understood that he could compel witnesses on his behalf.
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Visser, 2000 UT 88,ffi[13-15;Corwell, 2005 UT28, H 19. He argues, however, that his right
to a public trial by an impartial jury was "nowhere communicated" to him. Br. Aplt. 38.
While the plea court and written plea statement fully advised Lovell of his right to
have a unanimous jury determine his guilt, neither used the words "impartial" or "public."
But the record facts before the plea court, not including Lovell's previous trial experience,
show that he had a conceptual understanding of those rights. Lovell's previous trial
experience only bolsters that conclusion.
As to "impartial jury," the record facts of the proceeding before the plea court show
that Lovell had a conceptual understanding of that right. In a pre-plea, pre-trial conference
that Lovell attended, the plea court and counsel discussed the need for and the content of
juror questionnaires, including the need to add death-qualification issues to a questionnaire
that the plea court had used in a non-capital murder case. Lovell's counsel assured the plea
court that he would provide Lovell with a copy of the proposed questionnaire. R646-48,
653. Juror questionnaires are not designed to select biased juries. Thus, the process of
preparing questionnaires, which Lovell participated in, would have conveyed the concept
that he had the right to an impartial jury.
Moreover, by the time Lovell pled guilty, the jury selection process itself—by virtue
of preparing the questionnaires—was already under way. And the record shows that Lovell
understood that by pleading guilty he would be waiving any right to participate in selecting a
jury, because his attorney announced at the beginning of the plea hearing that this was the
time set to begin jury selection. R656. Thus, Lovell's experience in the proceedings before
the plea court gave him "first-hand knowledge of the method of ensuring the right to trial by
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an impartial jury." Visser, 2000 UT 88,f16 (holding that presence during jury selection
conveyed right to impartial jury for purposes of mid-trial plea).
But as the 23B court correctly found, the plea court also knew that this was not
LovelPs only experience with jury selection. The plea court knew that a jury had already
convicted Lovell of kidnapping and raping Ms. Yost. R659,676-78; R23,81,128,167,493.
Thus, the plea court would have known that by the time Lovell pled guilty in 1993, he had
already participated in selecting a jury in the 1986 felony case. As this Court held in Visser,
"the experience of witnessing and participating injury selection communicated the manner
of providing an impartial jury in a more tangible way than could mere words." Visser, 2000
UT 88, Tf 16. While that experience may have been gained in a prior proceeding, the plea
court was aware of that prior experience and, therefore, could rely on it in finding that Lovell
had a conceptual understanding of his right to an impartial jury.
The record before the plea court also supports a finding that Lovell had a conceptual
understanding that he had the right to a public trial. By the time Lovell pled guilty in June
1993, he had appeared before the plea court on numerous occasions. R72,187,190-91,41821,423-38,440,63,468,615,632-34,636-43, 645-35. The record shows that Lovell knew
his criminal proceedings were open to the public because he complained to the plea court
that he had received insufficient notice of the time for preliminary hearing to notify his
family members so that they could attend. R195. Significantly, Lovell never complained
that any of the hearings he attended were closed and the plea court, having presided over
those hearings, would have been well aware that they were open to the public. Indeed, at the
2005 23B hearing, Lovell agreed that a "crowd" attended all of the court appearances that
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pre-dated his guilty plea.5 R2995:85-86. Finally, the plea court accepted LovelPs guilty
plea in open court on the day that his trial was scheduled to begin. R656-95; R2996:86.
Lovell's personal trial experience in the proceedings in which he pleaded guilty thus
provided ample support for the 23B court's conclusion that the plea court complied with rule
11. See Corwell, 2005 UT 28, ^f 19 (plea court strictly complied with rule 11 even though it
did not use words "speedy trial," where defendant pled guilty one business day before trial);
Visser, 2000 UT 88,ffif14-16 (plea court strictly complied with rule 11 even though it did
not use words "speedy trial" or "impartial jury," where defendant pled guilty mid-trial).
Of course, Lovell's previous trial experience—on which the plea court could
rely—only bolsters that conclusion. The plea court knew when it accepted Lovell's plea that
he had been through a trial. The plea court would have known that the prior trial would not
have been held in secret.
Right against compelled self-incrimination. Lovell argues that although the plea
court "informed him that he was giving up his right to remain silent in the context of
pleading guilty," it "never informed [him] of his right against self incrimination, a trial
right." Br. Aplt. 39. Lovell acknowledges, however, that his right was expressly and fully
covered in the written plea statement:

5

The State agrees that Lovell's subjective knowledge of his right to a public trial, first
solicited in the 2005 proceedings, cannot support a finding of rule 11 compliance in 1993.
However, his testimony that a "crowd" attended all his pretrial hearings can and does support
the conclusion that the plea court would have known that Lovell was aware of that fact, thus
showing that he had a conceptual understanding of his right to a public trial. Moreover, as
discussed in Subpoint B, Lovell's subjective knowledge first revealed in 2005 is relevant to
show that he was not prejudiced by the plea court's failure to say "public trial."
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e.
I cannot be forced to incriminate myself and I do not have to
testify at any trial.
f.
If I do not want to testify, the jury will be told that no inference
adverse to me may be drawn from my failure to testify.
Id; R23 9. Because the written statement was properly incorporated, it may be considered in
determining strict rule 11 compliance.
Right to have prosecution prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt Rule 11 (e)(4)(A) requires that a plea court ascertain that "the defendant understands
the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those elements." Lovell asserts that although
the plea court gave him "generic, non-specific advisories that the State would have to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," it "never advised [him] that the prosecution would have to
prove each of the elements of first degree murder that he was pleading to beyond a
reasonable doubt." Br. Aplt. 39-40.
In fact, the written plea statement advised Lovell that the "government must prove
each and every element of the offenses charged against [him] beyond a reasonable doubt."
R239. Thus, that requirement of rule 11 was clearly met.
Lovell nevertheless suggests that this was not enough for strict rule 11 compliance,
because the trial court "failed to advise [him] that the prosecution would have to prove the
intent requirement beyond a reasonable doubt," and the written statement "omitted the intent
requirement entirely." R23 7-241. As the State understands this argument, Lovell contends
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that he was not informed of the intent element of aggravated murder and that he therefore
would not have understood that the State had to prove his intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
When the plea colloquy and written statement are read as whole, however, Lovell
clearly had a conceptual understanding that the prosecution would have to prove his intent
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The elements of aggravated murder that the State would have had to prove in this case
are that Lovell intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Joyce Yost for the purpose of
preventing her from testifying against him in the kidnapping and sexual assault trial. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(l)(i) (West 2004). These elements, including the intent
element, were explained to Lovell on the record. For example, the plea court asked Lovell if
he understood "that by pleading guilty to a capital felony, you will be admitting that you
intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Joyce Yost, and that your purpose in doing
that was to prevent her from testifying against you in the Davis County proceeding." R681
(emphasis added). The plea court then asked Lovell how he pled to the charge that he
"knowingly and intentionally caused the death of Joyce Yost to prevent her from testifying
against you." R682 (emphasis added). Lovell responded, "Guilty." R682.
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The foregoing demonstrates that Lovell understood that the elements of the charged
offense included that he intentionally or knowingly killed Ms. Yost. Therefore, the plea
court strictly complied with rule ll. 6
Right to be informed of the minimum and maximum penalties. Rule 11(e)(5)
requires that the plea court ascertain that the defendant "knows the minimum and maximum
sentence . . . that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered." Lovell
acknowledges, as he must, that he was informed of the minimum and maximum penalties for
aggravated murder. That information appears not only in his written plea statement, see
R238, but was also repeatedly discussed during the plea colloquy. See R656,660,661,668,
669,675,681,686-88.
Lovell asserts, however, that the plea court did not "discuss the minimum and
maximum sentence with [him] until after he pled guilty." Br. Aplt. 40. Thus, he claims,
there was no strict rule 11 compliance because he "pled guilty without first having an
understanding of the minimum and maximum sentences he was pleading to." Id.
The record before the plea court, however, shows that Lovell had a clear
understanding of the minimum and maximum sentences he faced before he pled guilty.

6

Other recitations of the elements on the record, while not express, also necessarily
conveyed the intentional or knowing mental state. For example, Lovell affirmed in his
written statement that he understood the elements of the crime to be that he murdered Ms.
Yost "to prevent her from testifying against him for raping her." R238-39. During the plea
colloquy, the plea court ascertained that Lovell understood that, by pleading guilty, he would
be admitting that he took Ms. Yost's life with no legal justification and "for the purpose of
preventing her from testifying against" him." R659-60. In the factual basis supporting his
plea, Lovell acknowledged that before killing Ms. Yost, he had "determined that he had to
kill the witness against" him. R677. By repeatedly stating that he killed Ms. Yost to prevent
her from testifying against him, Lovell necessarily admitted that he intended to kill her.
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First, in Lovell's motion to suppress, he quoted his statement to Rhonda Buttars that he knew
he could get the death penalty and "at the very least. . . life without parole." R84. That
motion was filed and ruled upon by the plea court. R80, 84-85,116. Second, before Lovell
pled guilty, his attorney presented the plea court with the written plea statement, which twice
listed the potential statutory penalties for aggravated murder as "death or life with or without
parole." R237-38. At that point, Lovell told the plea court that he had reviewed the written
statement with his attorney on the previous Friday and that day, and that he had "read it and
signed it." R669. Third, the plea court repeatedly informed Lovell before his plea that the
maximum penalty he faced was death. R660-61, 668, 681. The plea court also explained
that if Ms. Yost's body were recovered, "there would be a recommendation... that the death
penalty not be imposed, but that a life without parole be imposed." R661. Fourth, before
Lovell pled guilty, the prosecutor mentioned that "whether the sentence is life or death, that
if there's a sentence of death," there would be an automatic review by the Utah Supreme
Court. R675. Finally, Lovell's attorney stated at least twice before the plea that Lovell
intended to "elect to be sentenced under the new statute which would provide for three
sentencing options." R656, 669.
While it is true that the plea court did not thoroughly discuss the new statutory
sentencing options—death, life without parole, and life with parole—until after Lovell
announced his plea, the foregoing demonstrates that the plea court ascertained that Lovell
nevertheless understood the maximum and minimum penalties he faced before he pled
guilty.
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But even if the record were not so clear, there was no rule 11 violation merely because
the discussion of the full range of penalties came after Lovell pled guilty. As explained, that
discussion came during the plea hearing while the plea was still in play. Lovell told the plea
court that he understood the potential penalties. Presumably, if Lovell had said that he did
not understand the penalties, the plea court would have re-visited its acceptance of the plea.
Because Lovell clearly understood the potential maximum and minimum penalties for
his crime, the plea court strictly complied with rule 11.
The right to be informed of the State's burden ofproof in a capital sentencing
hearing. Lovell finally argues that the plea court violated rule 11, "and Lovell's guilty plea
could not have been 'knowingly and voluntarily made,'" because the plea court misinformed
him "concerning the government's burden of proof in a capital sentencing hearing." Br.
Aplt. 41. Specifically, Lovell complains that while the plea court told him that death could
be imposed "if the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors," it did not inform
him that "the State would also have to meet the second prong of State v. Wood, [648 P.2d 71,
81 (Utah 1982)], that the death penalty is the only justified and appropriate penalty beyond a
reasonable doubt." Br. Aplt. 41. Lovell asserts that "the failure to explain to [him] that his
guilty plea would waive his right to require the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the death penalty is the only appropriate sentence, and that the jury must unanimously agree
to this, would have certainly been a paramount factor weighing on his decision to plead
guilty." Br. Aplt. 42.
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As a threshold matter, Lovell's guilty plea did not waive his right to require the State
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt "that the imposition of the death penalty is justified and
appropriate in the circumstances." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(5)(b) (West 2004).7 The
State has that burden during the penalty phase whether or not the defendant pleads guilty.
Thus, the plea court did not err in not telling Lovell otherwise.
In any event, rule 11 does not require that the plea court find that a defendant is aware
of the State's burden of proof in a capital sentencing proceeding. It requires only that the
court find that the defendant "knows the minimum and maximum sentence." Utah R. Crim.
P. 11(e)(5). As explained, the record before the plea court amply supports such a finding.
To the extent that Lovell is claiming that his plea was rendered unknowing or
involuntary by the plea court's failure to inform him of the second Wood prong, he has not
explained how that could be. By omitting the second Wood prong, the plea court would
have, at most, conveyed to Lovell that it would be easier for the State to obtain a death
sentence than it actually was. If Lovell was willing to plead guilty despite that erroneous
belief, it is difficult to see how he would then be unwilling to plead guilty if he been had told
that it would, in fact, be more difficult for the State to obtain the death penalty.
In sum, Lovell has not demonstrated that the 23B court erroneously concluded that the
plea court strictly complied with rule 11.

Lovell misstates that the State is required to prove that "the death penalty is the only
justified and appropriate penalty
" Br. Aplt. 41. The controlling statutory language is in
the text.
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B. Even if the plea-taking court did not strictly comply with rule 11, Lovell
cannot show "good cause" where he was not prejudiced by any alleged
rule violation.
But even if the plea-taking court committed a technical rule 11 violation, the 23B
court correctly concluded that Lovell had not shown good cause to withdraw his plea where
any violation was clearly harmless. R2943-51.
The standard for showing prejudice under plain error or ineffective assistance of
counsel in the plea context is that "any error by the court [or counsel] actually 'affected the
outcome of the plea process.'" Dean, 2004 UT 63, If 23. In other words, the defendant must
show that "but for" the alleged error, he would not have pled guilty, but would have insisted
on going to trial. Id. at *f 22.
The 23B court found, based on the plea record and the testimony before it, "that
Lovell would have pleaded guilty regardless of the [plea court's] errors." R2949. In light of
the evidence, the 23B court found that Lovell's "insistence that he would not have pleaded
guilty [was] not credible." Id. Although Lovell now "bald[ly]" states that "he would not
have pleaded guilty had the trial judge fully informed him of his rights under rule 11," he
told the plea court that he had "pretty much wanted to do exactly this [plead guilty] for a
long time." R2950; R665. Lovell also affirmed to the plea court that "he wanted to make a
clean breast of this and come forward," and end the matter "so that neither his family [nor]
the family of the victim would have to go through a protracted trial." R2950; R663-64.
Lovell further acknowledged that "he concluded on his own and communicated to [his
attorney] on numerous occasions... that he did not want to go through with the trial process
and didn't want to have that happen, given all the circumstances, and wanted to make an
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admission before [the plea court]." R2950; R665. Lovell also affirmed to the plea court that
he had "been steadfast" and "unwavering" in wanting to plead guilty for "at least" "three or
four months." R2950; R665.
LovelPs attorney also explained that he and Lovell began having "serious
discussions" about pleading guilty after they had exhausted their attempts to suppress
Lovell's "extraordinarily damaging" taped admissions to Buttars. R663-64. The 23B court
noted that Lovell "blithely" ignored his taped "confession of murder to Buttars" in claiming
that he would have not pled guilty but for the plea court's alleged rule 11 errors. R2951.
And, finally, Lovell admitted at the 23B hearing that at the time he pled guilty he was
in fact aware of at least some of the rights that he now complains that the plea court did not
inform him of. For example, Lovell admitted that he had known for "decades" that he had
the right to a public trial, and that he never thought that he would be tried in secret.
R2995:86-87. He also suggested that he understood that he had a right to an impartial jury
when he testified that he would have chosen a sentencing jury if he had known that the trial
judge would sentence him to death. R2995:46. Lovell would not have professed a
preference for a sentencing jury if he had believed that his jury would be biased.
Lovell argues that the 23B court's application of harmless error review to his rule 11
arguments contradicts long-standing precedent from both this Court and the court of appeals.
Br. Aplt. 49-51. A review of the cases, however, shows that pre-Gibbons (or pre-strictcompliance), this Court applied harmless error review to rule 11 violations, and that postGibbons (or post-strict-compliance), this Court has never directly held that harmless-error
review does not continue. For the reasons stated below, this Court should clarify that
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harmless error review applies to technical rule 11 violations just as it applies in nearly every
other context, including constitutional violations. It should also affirm the 23B court's
finding that any rule 11 violations in this case were harmless.
1. Harmless error review pre- and post-Gibbons.
Pre-Gibbons. Over 20 years ago, this Court held that rule 11 violations were subject
to harmless error review. State v. Kay, 111 P.2d 1294, 1301-02 (Utah 1986). In Kay, the
State argued that the trial court's violation of rule 11 rendered an "otherwise voluntary and
lawful" guilty plea void. Id. at 1301. In response, this Court cited rule 30, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure: "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded." Id. at 1302. This Court explained that rule
30 "reflects our 'harmless error' rule, and we find it applicable to situations involving
violations of Rule 11." Id. "Accordingly, a Rule 11 error will not invalidate the plea taken
unless the error results in a substantial violation of a party's rights." Id.
The Kay court explained that to hold otherwise "would be to sanction a remedy far
worse than the wrong." Id. at 1301. The Court observed that adopting a rule that "any
violation of Rule 11 automatically voids the resultant plea, even when the plea is knowingly
and voluntarily entered,... would encourage defendants, convicted and sentenced after such
a plea, to attack their convictions for purely tactical reasons, either by direct appeal or by
seeking habeas corpus long after the fact." Id. Noting that it had "refused to overturn
convictions upon such challenges in the past," this Court warned that "the ultimate result [of
automatic reversal] would be to free a number of convicted persons for nothing more than
technical errors in the acceptance of their voluntary guilty pleas." Id. at 1301-02.
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The Kay court also observed that federal rule 11, upon which our rule 11 is modeled,
was similarly subject to harmless error review. The Court noted that the Supreme Court in
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969) had "suggested that any violation of federal
Rule 11 rendered a guilty plea void," but that the rule was later amended "to provide that
variations from the procedures outlined in the rule should be disregarded unless the variation
affected a defendant's substantial rights." Id. at 1302 n.8. The Court explained that the
amendment to federal rule 11 "was added to clarify the fact that the harmless error provision
of Rule 52(a) [our rule 30's counterpart] applied to Rule 11 violations." Id. It then added,
"We see no reason why the harmless error concept should not also apply to Utah's analogue
to federal Rule 11," because a "party is no more entitled to a perfect plea proceeding than he
is to a perfect trial." Id.
Gibbons. About a year later, State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,1312-14 (Utah 1987),
imposed what later came to be termed strict rule 11 compliance. The new rule had two
purposes: (1) "to assist trial judges in making the constitutionally required determination
that the defendant's plea is truly knowing and voluntary"; and (2) "to discourage, or at least
facilitate swift disposition of, post-conviction attacks on the validity of guilty pleas because
the trial judge will have produced a clearly adequate record for review." Id. at 1314.
Gibbons, however, did not address whether a technical rule 11 violation would result
in automatic reversal or be subject to harmless error review. It did not cite or acknowledge
Kay's holding that rule 11 violations were subject to harmless error review.
The omission was likely because the issue never arose. Gibbons had failed to file a
motion to withdraw his plea in the trial court. Without ruling on the plea's validity, this
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Court remanded for Gibbons to file a motion to withdraw. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1311-12.
This Court retained jurisdiction in the event Gibbons wished to pursue his appeal after the
lower court ruled on his motion. Id. at 1312 n.2. To give guidance to the lower court, this
Court went on to explain the new strict rule 11 requirement. Id. at 1312-14. As stated,
however, it did not expressly address whether a rule 11 violation should be subject to
harmless error review.
Post-Gibbons. Since Gibbons, this Court has held that strict rule 11 compliance raises
a rebuttable presumption that a plea is knowing and voluntary. See, e.g., State v. Gamblin,
2000 UT 44, Tf 11,1 P.3d 1108. Thus, even though a trial court might have strictly complied
with rule 11, a defendant might be able to show that his plea was nonetheless unknowing or
involuntary.
In contrast, decisions from both this Court and the court of appeals have treated the
failure to strictly comply with rule 11 as raising a presumption that the plea is not knowing
or voluntary. See, e.g., State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216,217 (Utah 1992) (affirming court of
appeals' reversal where no strict rule 11 compliance); State v. Smith, 111 P.2d 464, 464-66
(Utah 1989) (reversing where, in violation of rule 11 (e)(5), defendant misinformed regarding
minimum-mandatory nature of potential sentence and eligibility for probation); State v.
Mills, 898 P.2d 819, 823-24 (Utah App. 1995)

(reversing where no strict rule 11

compliance); State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332,1335 (Utah App. 1989) (per curiam) (same).
Indeed, the court of appeals has equated failure to strictly comply with rule 11 to the
statutory "good cause" standard for withdrawing a plea. See Mills, 898 P.2d at 821-22; State
v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah App. 1994). Some court of appeals cases have at
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least implicitly suggested that this presumption is irrebuttable.

See, e.g., State v.

Tamawiecki, 2000 UT App 186,ffif18-19, 5 P.3d 1222. Thus, under those cases, while a
defendant may rebut the presumption of voluntariness raised by strict compliance, the State
may not rebut the presumption of involuntariness raised by non-strict compliance.
But this Court has never directly held that an alleged rule 11 violation may not be
reviewed for harmless error. See State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, \ 22 n.4, 69 P.3d 838
("[I]t is not clear whether the harmless error doctrine continues to apply to rule 11 violations
after Gibbons."). It has, however, hinted that harmless error review is not inconsistent with
requiring strict rule 11 compliance. For example, in State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119,1124 n.3
(Utah 1991), this Court recognized that although the federal rule 11 had been amended to
expressly provide for harmless error review in the guilty plea context, that provision still did
"not relieve trial courts from strict compliance with Rule 11." In other words, the fact that
trial courts have a duty of strict compliance under rule 11 does not mean that a failure to
comply with that duty cannot be reviewed for harmless error.
This Court also recently stopped short of holding that a lack of strict rule 11
compliance results in automatic reversal: "[A]n appellate determination of sentencing-courtstrict-compliance error will almost certainly rise to the level of an abuse of discretion in the
instance when a sentencing court denies a motion to withdraw a plea that was not
accompanied by strict compliance with constitutional and procedural requirements." State v.
Bechstead, 2006 UT 42, If 8, 140 P.3d 1288 (emphasis added).
And, while this Court has not expressly applied a harmless-error analysis in a postGibbons case where the claimed rule 11 violation has been preserved, it has required the
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defendant to show harm when the claim is unpreserved. See, e.g., Dean, 2004 UT 63,ffif2223 (plain error review of unpreserved alleged rule violation requires defendant to show
prejudice, i.e., that "'but for5 the alleged error, he or she would not have pled guilty"); State
v. Hittle, 2004 UT 46, f 5, 94 P.3d 268 (same). Likewise, this Court has required a
defendant to show prejudice when claiming that the alleged error in the plea process resulted
from ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12,ffl[16-17, 26 P.3d
203.
Lovell relies on the court of appeals' decision in Mora and this Court's decisions in
Bluemel and Salazar to argue that it is well-settled that rule 11 violations are presumed
harmful and require automatic reversal. Br. Aplt. 49-50. Those cases, however, do not
support that claim. First, while the court of appeals in Mora presumed harm, it did so only
because it concluded that the alleged rule 11 violations rendered the plea involuntary. Mora,
2003 UT App 117, Tf 22. But the Mora court also acknowledged that "it is not clear whether
the harmless error doctrine continues to apply to rule 11 violations after Gibbons." Id. at f
22 n.4. Thus, rather than supporting the claim that the issue of harmless error review is wellsettled, Mora demonstrates that it is not.
This Court's decision in Bluemel likewise does not support Lovell's claim that the
issue of harmless error review is well-settled. Bluemel was an appeal from the denial of a
post-conviction petition challenging the validity of a guilty plea. Bluemel v. State, 2007 UT
90,173 P.3d 842. The court of appeals, relying on Mora, had presumed harm for a technical
rule 11 violation in Bluemel's plea. See Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT App 141,ffl[10-17,134
P.3d 181. On certiorari review, this Court held that a technical rule 11 violation was not
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enough to set aside a guilty plea in a post-conviction proceeding. Bluemel, 2007 UT 90, fflf
18-19. Rather, in post-conviction, the plea must be shown to be unknowing or involuntary.
Id. at 19. This Court did not address whether harmless-error review should apply to rule 11
violations properly raised on direct appeal.
This Court did, however, quote the following from Salazar. "Tf this were a direct
appeal from denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea,... failure to strictly comply with
[rule 11] would be grounds for reversal.'" Bluemel, 2007 UT 90, ^f 18 (quoting Salazar v.
Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 991 n.6 (Utah 1993)). See Br. Aplt. 50. But Salazar, like Bluemel,
was a post-conviction case. Salazar, 852 P.2d at 989-91. Thus, that statement, which cited
no authority, was unnecessary to the holding, and, therefore, dicta.
In sum, although this Court has held pre-Gibbons—i.e., in Kay—that harmless error
review applies to rule 11 violations, it has never directly overruled that precedent in a postGibbons case. It has, however, applied harmless error review when the rule 11 violation is
unpreserved. As explained below, this Court should now extend harmless error review to
preserved rule 11 claims.
2. This Court has amended Rule 11 to expressly adopt harmless error
review in guilty pleas; that amendment applies to this case.8
While this Court has never directly held that harmless-error review does not apply to
post-Gibbons rule 11 violations, it has expressly adopted that position in the rule itself.
Effective November 1, 2005, this Court amended rule 11 to state:

8

Although the 23B court did not rely on this ground to conclude that rule 11
violations were subject to harmless error review, this Court may affirm on any alternative
ground appearing in record. Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ^ 10, 52 P.3d 1158.
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(/) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as
a whole. Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does
not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this
rule is not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea.
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(/) (emphasis added). This amendment is comparable to federal rule
11(h), which also expressly provides for harmless error review of rule 11 violations. See
Kay, 111 P.2d at 1301-02.
That amendment, although adopted in 2005, should be applied to this case.
Ordinarily, a new rule of criminal procedure may be applied retroactively, unless it
represents "a clear break with the past." State v. Hoff 814 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Utah 1991).
See also State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503,508-09 (Utah 1997). An amendment or decision is not
a clear break with the past, unless it "caused 'such an abrupt and fundamental shift in
doctrine as to constitute an entirely new rule which in effect replaced an older one.'" Baker,
935 P.2d at 509 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 551 (1982)). "'Such a
break has been recognized only when a decision explicitly overrules a past precedent of this
Court, or disapproves a practice this Court arguably has sanctioned in prior cases.'" Id.
(quoting Johnson, 457 U.S. at 551).
The amendment here is not a clear break from the past. As stated, before Gibbons,
this Court expressly held in Kay that harmless error review applies to rule 11 by virtue of
rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. This Court has never explicitly overruled Kay,
nor directly held that harmless error review does not apply post-Gibbons. Thus, the adoption
of rule 11(1) should be read as a clarification of existing rules, not as an overruling of a past
precedent. The amendment, therefore, applies to this case.
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3. This Court should apply harmless error review for rule 11 violations
in any event, just as it does in nearly every other context.
Even if the 2005 amendment does not apply to Lovell, this Court should reaffirm Kay
and apply harmless error review to technical rule 11 violations. If error in a guilty plea
proceeding is not harmful—i.e., that but for the error defendant would not have pled
guilty—common sense dictates that it cannot be "good cause" for withdrawing a plea.
The majority of jurisdictions recognize the senselessness of undoing a guilty plea
based on technical rule error alone and thus require a showing of harm. As stated, federal
courts—and now Utah—do so by specific rule. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h). Several other
states have adopted a rule similar to federal rule 11(h) and Utah's rule 11(1). See, e.g., Del.
Super. Ct. R. 11(h); D.C. Crim. P. R. 11(h); Fla. Crim. P. R. 3.172(j); Mont. Code Ann. § 4612-213 (2001) (restating Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h)); W.Va. R. Crim. P. 11(h); Wyo. R. Crim. P.
11(h).
A number of other states, like Kay, use a general statute or rule, similar to Utah's rule
30, to apply harmless error review to technical rule violations in the guilty plea context. See,
e.g., State v. Guzman, 769 So.2d 1158, 1163 (La. 2000) (citing La. C. Crim. P. art. 921);
State v. Hendricks, 531 S.E.2d 896, 898 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (citingN.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A1443(a)); State v. Newsome, 778 S.W.2d 34,36 (Tenn. 1989) (citing Term. R. Crim.. P. 52(a)
& Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b)); Ducker v. State, 45 S.W.3d 791,795 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (citing
Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b)). See also N.D. R. Crim. P. 11 (citing N.D. R. Crim. P. 52(a) in
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explanatory note). But the majority of states applying harmless error review to technical
errors in the guilty plea context do so absent any statute or court rule.9
Applying harmless error review to technical plea violations is sound policy. On the
one hand, a defendant has suffered no infringement of his rights when the plea court omits or
misstates them during the plea process if the omission or misstatement did not cause the
defendant to plead guilty when he otherwise would not have. On the other hand, presuming

9

See, e.g., In re Moser, 862 P.2d 723,730 (Cal. 1993) {en banc) (defendant entitled to
relief for court's plea misadvisement only if he shows prejudice); Young v. People, 30 P.3d
202, 204, 208 (Colo. 2001) (failure to advise defendant of plea's parole consequences
harmless); State v. Irala, 792 A.2d 109,123 (Conn. Ct. App. 2002) (failure to tell defendant
she could withdraw pleas in event of different sentence harmless); State v. Cornelio, 727
P.2d 1125,1127 (Haw. 1986) (failure to inform defendant of nature of plea agreement, that
trial court not bound by agreement, and maximum sentence harmless); People v. Woods, 480
N.E.2d 179,183 (111. Ct. App. 1985) (failure to ask if promises had been made to defendant
harmless); State v. McDaniel, 499 N.E.2d 226,227 (Ind. 1986) (failure to advise of possible
increased sentence harmless); State v. Ford, 930 P.2d 1089,1095-96 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997)
(failure to recite elements of offense in plea hearing harmless); People v. Young, 250 N. W.2d
523, 525 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (error in accepting plea without prosecutor's
acknowledgment harmless); State v. Bowley, 938 P.2d 592, 596-97 (Mont. 1997) (failure to
ask if defendant under influence of drugs or alcohol harmless); State v. Gray, 388 N.W.2d
836, 837 (Neb. 1986) ("Mere failure to comply with precise ceremonial or verbal formality
in arraignment and entry of a plea does not require setting aside a defendant's guilty plea
which is otherwise entered in accordance with statutory and constitutional requirements");
State v. Riker, 905 P.2d 706,710 (Nev. 1995) (failure to expressly state that probation not a
sentencing option harmless); State v. Taylor, 403 A.2d 889, 891, 895-96 (N.J. 1979) (if no
"significant possibility of harm... we render a disservice to the State and to the public if we
vacate a plea every time a technical error has occurred"); People v. Empey, 531 N.Y.S.2d 37,
38 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (error of allowing prosecutor to participate in plea allocution did
not warrant setting aside guilty plea); State v. Gales, 111 N.E.2d 497, 500 (Ohio Ct. App.
1999) (test is whether court's error prejudiced defendant in that he would not have pled
guilty had error not been made); Carey v. State, 902 P.2d 1116, 1117-18 (Okl. Crim. App.
1995) (finding both harmless and harmful error in plea proceeding); State v. Frizell, 627 P2d
21, 23 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (failure to inform defendant of possibility of deportation
harmless); Commonwealth v. McNeill, 305 A.2d 51, 53-54 (Pa. 1973) (failure to inform
defendant of possible maximum sentence harmless); State v. Van Egdom, 292 N.W.2d 586,
589 (S.D. 1980) (failure to make verbatim record of plea agreement harmless).
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prejudice does nothing to prevent infringing defendants' rights; it merely grants a windfall to
defendants suffering from nothing more than buyer's remorse. See Kay, 111? 2d at 1301-02
(result of no harmless error review for rule 11 violations would be to "free a number of
convicted persons for nothing more than technical errors in the acceptance of their voluntary
guilty pleas").
And, contrary to Lovell's brief, applying harmless error review will not "undermine
. . . the stated purposes behind strict compliance." Br. Aplt. 51. As stated, the purpose of
strict rule 11 compliance is to assist trial judges in determining that a defendant's plea is
truly knowing and voluntary, while discouraging and facilitating "swift disposition of []
post-conviction attacks on the validity of guilty pleas." Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1314. Trial
courts will still have an incentive to strictly comply with rule 11 because doing so raises a
presumption that the plea is knowing and voluntary. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 11. But
punishing trial courts and society by setting aside guilty pleas based on harmless mistakes
encourages, rather than discourages, attacks on pleas. See Kay, 111 P.2d at 1301-02.
In sum, as the 23B correctly recognized, harmless error review should apply to
technical rule 11 violations.
4. Lovell was not prejudiced where he has not shown that "but for" the
plea court's alleged errors he would not have pled guilty, but would
have insisted on going to trial.
The record supports the 23B court's finding that notwithstanding Lovell's self-serving
protestations, no alleged plea error affected his decision to plead guilty. Lovell and his
attorney made it clear to the plea court that he had decided to plead guilty only after he could
not get his taped confession to Buttars suppressed. R663-64. Lovell also told the plea court
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that he had wanted to plead guilty for three or four months "to make a clean breast of this"
and to spare his and Ms. Yost's family the strain of a trial. R663-64. None of the alleged
rule 11 errors affected these professed motives for the plea. Therefore, none caused him to
plead guilty.
But even if Loveli's professed reasons for pleading guilty were false, the record and
its fairest inferences, preclude a finding of harm. Buttars' testimony, Loveli's recorded
statements, and the circumstantial and motive evidence made Loveli's conviction all but
certain. Cf Hill v. Lockhart, A1A U.S. 52, 59-60 (1985) (assessing prejudice element in
ineffective-assistance challenge to plea turns, in large part, on likelihood that defendant
could have succeeded if he had gone to trial). Lovell knew from the beginning that he had
one bargaining chip to avoid a death sentence—producing Ms. Yost's body. And the State
agreed not to seek a death sentence if Lovell could do that. R244-46; R2996:24. When
Lovell failed to perform his side of that bargain, he recognized that he had one chance left to
save his life: plead guilty and present himself to the sentencing judge as a reformed penitent.
He thus told the sentencing judge that he wanted to make a clean breast of things and that he
did not want to put his family and Ms. Yost's family through a trial.
Lovell had no second thoughts about his plea until his strategy failed. Indeed, his
original reason for moving to withdraw his plea reveals that his real complaint is with his
sentence, not any error in the plea process. Lovell founded his original pro se motion to
withdraw on his assertion that he had always wanted a sentencing jury, but that he had
instead opted forjudge sentencing based on his attorney's advice. R383.

51

Thus, the 23B court did not clearly err in finding that Lovell's motivation for pleading
guilty had nothing to do with his claimed errors in the plea process. Rather, Lovell would
have pled guilty whether or not the plea court had strictly complied with rule 11. Any
alleged rule 11 violation, therefore, was harmless.

n.
THE 23B COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT DID
NOT SUA SPONTE CONCLUDE THAT LOVELL'S STATE DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED IN THE PLEA-TAKING
Lovell argues that his state constitutional due process rights were violated during the
plea process in two respects: (1) he "did not intelligently waive his state constitutional rights
to the presumption of innocence" and "to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury"; and (2)
the plea court "misstated the law regarding his right under article I, section 10, to a
unanimous jury." Br. Aplt. 42-44 (emphasis and capitalization deleted).

Defendant

acknowledges that he did not raise his state constitutional claims below. Id. at 47-49. He
therefore seeks review of these claims under plain error, ineffective assistance of counsel, or
manifest injustice. Id. Lovell has shown neither plain error nor ineffective assistance of
counsel on either claim.
A. The 23B court did not obviously or prejudicially err in not sua sponle
finding that Lovell did not intelligently waive his trial rights under article
I, § 12, of the Utah Constitution.
Relying onBoykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), Lovell states that the federal due
process clause prohibits the taking of a plea without a defendant's knowing and voluntary
waiver of three federal constitutional rights: (1) the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination; (2) the right to trial by jury; and (3) the right to confront one's accusers. Br.
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Aplt. 42-43. Loveil does not argue, however, that his plea was taken in violation of federal
due process or that he did not knowingly or voluntarily waive the foregoing rights. Rather,
he argues that under "the same analysis in Boykin, the Due Process Clause of the Utah
Constitution is violated if a defendant does not voluntarily waive a known constitutional
right under Article I, sections 7, 10, and 12." Br. Aplt. 43. Loveil then lists several rights
included in section 12, such as the right to testify in one's own behalf, to be confronted by
the witnesses against him, to compel defense witnesses, and to a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury. Id. Loveil also suggests that the right to the presumption of innocence, while
not expressly mentioned, is encompassed within article I, § 7, the state due process clause.
Id at 44 (citing State v. Harrison, 24 P.3d 936, 947 (2001)). Loveil argues that his state
constitutional due process rights were violated because he "did not intelligently waive" two
of the foregoing state constitutional rights: "(1) the presumption of innocence, and (2) the
right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury." Id. at 44.
To prevail under plain error, Loveil must show both that the claimed error should
have been obvious to the 23B court and that, but for this error, he would not have pled guilty.
See Dean, 2004 UT 63,fflf15-17,22. To show obviousness, Loveil "must show that the law
governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was made." Id. at f 16.
LovelPs argument in effect seeks to elevate verbatim recitation of rule 11 rights to
state constitutional status. He cites only article I, § 7—the state due process clause—in
support of his claim that it should have been obvious to the 23B court that not informing him
of the presumption of innocence and the right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury
violated the state constitution. Br. Aplt. 47-48. He cites no authority supporting that claim,
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and Boykin, the one case he relies on, applies only the federal due process clause. Id. at 4244. But while Boykin declines to "presume waiver" of three important federal rights, those
rights do not include the two specific rights for which Lovell now seeks state constitutional
protection. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243.
No governing law at the time Lovell pled guilty held that the Utah Constitution is
violated when a defendant is not adequately advised, as required by rule 11, of the
presumption of innocence or the right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury. If
anything, case law suggested the opposite. In Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 992 (Utah
1993), this Court held that "compliance with Utah's rule 11 is not required under the Utah
Constitution." Consequently, it would not have been obvious to either the plea or the 23B
court that not advising Lovell of two rule 11 rights would violate the state due process
clause.
In any event, Lovell has not shown prejudice. First, as explained in Point [, Lovell
was adequately advised both of his right to the presumption of innocence and his right to a
speedy, public trial by an impartial jury. Second, also as explained, Lovell has not shown
that but for the alleged errors he would not have pled guilty.
Lovell alternatively argues that his counsel was ineffective for not raising his state due
process claim below. Br. Aplt. 48. But Lovell cannot show deficient performance where the
only applicable law—Salazar—suggested that failure to advise him of two rule 11 rights
does not amount to state constitutional error. See Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1052
(10th Cir.), cert, denied, 537 U.S. 1093 (2002) (counsel does not perform deficiently by
"failing to predict future law"); State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900,906-07 (Utah App. L 994) (if
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error should have been plain to trial court, it should also have been plain to counsel), rev 'd
on other grounds, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996). And, as explained, Lovell has not shown
prejudice.10 See Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^J 22 (equating plain error and ineffectiveness prej udice
standards).
B.

Lovell has not shown that any misstatement of the law on unanimity by
the plea court amounted to an obvious, prejudicial error under the state
constitution.
Lovell also argues that his state due process rights were violated when the plea court

misstated the unanimity requirement for the statutory aggravating factors. Br. Aplt. 44-45.
Again, Lovell has not shown obvious prejudicial crroi,
The State charged three statutory aggravators: (1) Lovell murdered Ms. Yost to
prevent her from testifying, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1 )(i); (2) Lovell murdered her
during the course of an aggravated burglary or aggravated kidnapping, see id. at (l)(d); and
(3) Lovell had a prior conviction for a violent felony, see id. at (l)(h). Rl-2; R669-70.
Lovell's written plea statement relied only on the first aggravator. R238.
During the colloquy, the plea court explained to Lovell that even though he was
pleading to only one aggravator, if the case went to trial, the State could proceed on all three
aggravators. R672-75. The court continued: "[I]f a jury made a finding on any one of those

In a three-sentence paragraph, Lovell also argues that the alleged error may be
reviewed "under the manifest-injustice doctrine." Br. Aplt. 49. This Court, however, has
generally equated manifest injustice with plain error. See Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, ^f
61, 130 P.3d 325 ("manifest injustice [is] synonymous with plain error"). Because Lovell
has not explained how the two doctrines are different, the State does not separately treat this
claim.
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three, and in fact, they wouldn't even all have to agree on the same theory, as long as all - as
all twelve jurors agreed that you did one of those three things

" R673-74.

Lovell argues that the plea court misstated the law when it said that "the jury would
not have to be unanimous on any one particular aggravating factor to convict him of capital
murder." Br. Aplt. 44. Thus, he argues, he was misinformed that "he would be waiving the
right to a [unanimous] jury as to the aggravating factor." Id. at 46. This, he contends,
violated his state due process rights because "he could not have intelligently waived his right
to a unanimous jury." Id. at 47.
Lovell raised this argument below as a rule 11 violation. Rl 844-45. He has
abandoned that argument on appeal in favor of his state constitutional due process claim.11
Thus, the only question on appeal is whether the 23B court plainly erred in not sua sponte
setting aside the plea on the basis of the state constitution.
As a preliminary matter, the plea court's statement on unanimity is ambiguous. While
the plea court said that the jury "wouldn't even all have to agree on the same theory," it then
immediately stated that "all twelve jurors" would have to agree "that you did one of those
three things." R673-74. But to the extent the plea court stated that not all twelve jurors
would have to agree on the specific aggravator, it was clearly wrong. See State v. Tillman,
750 P.2d 546, 578-80, 585-88 (Utah 1988).
But that alleged clearly erroneous statement of the law does not amount to obvious
error. Lovell points to no authority that requires a plea court, as a matter of state

11

One reason for abandoning the rule 11 argument is that rule 11 does not require
informing a defendant of the jury unanimity requirement. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e).
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constitutional due process, to inform a defendant of the jury unanimity requirement. Indeed,
as stated in footnote 13 above, even rule 11 does not require that.
But even assuming obvious error, Lovell has not shown prejudice. See Dean, 2004
UT 63, ^f 22 (plain error review in plea context requires showing of prejudice). He has not
argued that he pleaded guilty because he believed that the jury would not have to reach
unanimity on the specific aggravating circumstance. See id. Indeed, the record shows that
all three aggravators were undisputed and that there was no aggravator on which a jury
would not have been unanimous if the case had gone to trial. Lovell admitted in Court to the
first aggravator: that he kidnapped and murdered Ms. Yost to prevent her from testifying
against him on the prior aggravated kidnapping and sexual assault charges. He also
confessed as much on tape. There was no theory of the case on which a jury could have
convicted Lovell for murdering Ms. Yost without also finding that he kidnapped her. The
State had a copy of the judgment on Lovell's prior aggravated robbery conviction. R279.
Finally, Lovell, through his attorney, admitted to all three aggravators during the plea
hearing. R670. Thus, Lovell knew that the undisputed evidence would lead each juror to
find all three aggravators. See Tillman, 750 P.2d at 580 n. 1 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("Even
if the principle ofjuror unanimity as to aggravating circumstances could have been violated
under the instruction, the assumed error would clearly be harmless because there is no real
dispute in this case that the defendant in fact committed arson, aggravated arson, burglary,
and aggravated burglary. That evidence is not really contested.").
Lovell, therefore, has not shown that any misstatement of the unanimity requirement
caused him to plead guilty when he otherwise would not have.
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in.
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REACH LOVELL'S INADEQUATELY
BRIEFED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM; IF IT
DOES, LOVELL HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THE 23B COURT
CLEARLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLEA COUNSEL
PERFORMED CONSTITUTIONALLY EFFECTIVELY12
Lovell finally argues that the 23B court erred in finding that his plea counsel
performed constitutionally effectively. Br. Aplt. 51-60. Lovell divides his argument into
two subpoints. In subpoint A, he complains that the 23B court improperly limited him in
presenting evidence of his plea counsel's ineffectiveness. Br. Aplt. 51-54. Spending little
more than a page, he then cursorily attacks the 23B court's nearly 20-page ineffectiveness
ruling as erroneous. Br. Aplt. 53-54. In subpoint B, he claims that his attorney was
ineffective under the ABA Guidelines for Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel
in Death Penalty Cases for not hiring "experts and an investigator specifically for mitigation
investigation." Br. Aplt. 57-59.
As explained below, the 23B court properly limited the presentation of evidence on
ineffectiveness to the plea process. This Court should not address Lovell's challenge to the
23B court's ineffective assistance of counsel ruling under Subpoint A, because it is
inadequately briefed.

But, in any event, Lovell has not shown that the 23B court's

underlying findings were clearly erroneous or that it erred in concluding that counsel's
alleged errors did not prejudice him. Finally, Lovell has not shown how his counsel's failure
to hire experts and an investigator for mitigation purposes rendered counsel constitutionally
ineffective during the plea process.
12

This point responds to Point IV, pp. 51-60, of Lovell's brief.
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A.

Lovell has not shown that the 23B court improperly limited his evidence
on ineffectiveness nor has he adequately briefed his challenge to the 23B
court's ineffectiveness ruling.
1. The23B court pi operly limited evidence on ineffectiveness In the plea •
process.
Lovell first complains that the 23B court improperly limited his ability to present

evidence that his plea counsel was ineffective.

Br. Aplt. 51-53. Lovell appears to

specifically complain that he was not allowed to present evidence that his plea counsel was
ineffective in his penalty phase preparation. Id He argues that "by restricting [him] from
presenting evidence regarding what [his plea counsel] failed to do as far as investigating and
preparing [his] case, the Rule 23B court made it virtually impossible for [him] to show
prejudice." Id. at 53.
The 23B court, however, properly limited its inquiry, and thus the evidentiary hearing,
to evidence regarding whether Lovell should be allowed to withdraw his plea. This Court
remanded solely for the purpose of considering "the merits of Mr. Lovell's original and
renewed motions pursuant to the procedures mandated by Rule 23B." LovellII, 2005 UT 31,
f 29. Lovell's original motion asked to withdraw his plea solely on the basis that his
attorney erroneously led him to waive a sentencing jury. R383. His renewed motion asked
to withdraw his plea solely on the ground that the plea court did not strictly comply with rule
11. Rl 827-29. The rule 23B court would have thus been justified in limiting the evidentiary
hearing to those claims.
But the 23B court, with the State's agreement, allowed Lovell to raise five ineffective
assistance of counsel claims with respect to the plea process. R2956. The 23B court
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refused, however, to allow Lovell to further expand the scope of inquiry to evidence that plea
counsel was also ineffective with respect to the penalty hearing. For example, the 23B court
would not allow Lovell to present evidence of his plea counsel's "alleged failure in not
following ABA guidelines to hire a psychological expert during the penalty phase." R2956.
The 23B court viewed this claim as irrelevant to the motions to withdraw the plea and as
more appropriately the subject of Lovell's pending rule 65C post-conviction petition.
R2956.
That ruling was correct. This Court had already affirmed Lovell's sentence on the
first direct appeal. Lovell 1,1999 UT 40. Because the Court affirmed Lovell's sentence in
the first direct appeal, and, on the second direct appeal, limited the remand to issues related
to Lovell's plea, it would have been inappropriate for the 23B court to expand the scope of
inquiry.
Moreover, as stated, the 23B court would have been well within its discretion to
preclude any evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel and to limit its inquiry solely to
the issues raised in Lovell's motions to withdraw. It instead permitted Lovell to raise
ineffective assistance claims related to the plea process itself. The 23B court, therefore, did
not err in limiting the issues to the validity of the plea process.
2. Lovell has not adequately briefed his challenge to the 23B court's
ineffectiveness ruling.
Lovell's claim in subpoint A—that the 23B court erred in finding his plea counsel
effective—is inadequately briefed. This Court should, therefore, decline to address it. Rule
24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires an appellant's brief to set forth an
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argument that "contain[s] the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the
issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial
court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." It is not
enough under this rule to superficially cite to authority; rather the rule requires a "substantive
examination" of the contention presented. State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2,fflf11-13,974 P.2d
269.
Moreover, "a reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with
pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may
dump the burden of argument and research." Id. at \ 11 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). Accord State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 6, 1 P.3d 1008. Cf. United
States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955,956 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Judges are not pigs, hunting for truffles
buried in [the parties'] briefs"). "Briefs that do not comply with rule 24 'may be disregarded
or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court.'" Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 8 (quoting Utah
R. App. P. 24[(k)]).
As stated, Lovell raised, and the 23B court addressed, five ineffective assistance of
counsel claims related to the pica process: (1) counsel "conducted no formal discovery"; (2)
counsel "failed to provide proper advice concerning the plea negotiations, including allowing
Lovell to be questioned by law enforcement prior to signing any plea agreement," and failing
"to inform Lovell that statements made to law enforcement in order 1o eoniph with the
Memorandum of Understanding could be used against him if [he] could not locate Ms.
Yost's remains"; (3) counsel "failed to consider critical evidence relating to how Lovell
disposed of Ms. Yost's body"; (4) counsel "improperly advised Lovell that [the plea court]
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would not impose the death penalty if he pleaded guilty"; and (5) counsel "failed to ask
Buttars, LovelPs estranged wife, questions regarding her participation in Ms. Yost's
murder." R2956.
The 23B court spent nearly 20 pages of its detailed 50-page memorandum decision
addressing these claims. R2951-70. In those pages, the 23B court points to the testimony
and evidence it relied on in finding that counsel was constitutionally effective.

See, e.g.,

R2962, 2963, 2965, 2967. The 23B court also made credibility findings in which it
expressly discounted Lovell's testimony and accepted his plea counsel's testimony. See, e.g.
R2960-61, 2964-65, 2967-68. The memorandum decision also explains the 23B court's
reasoning under the Strickland standard. See R2951-70.
Yet, Lovell spends little more than a page and barely a paragraph for each claim.
Nowhere does he explain precisely what his ineffectiveness claims are, what the 23B court
ruled, or the basis for its ruling. Br. Aplt. 53-54. He does not marshal the evidence
supporting the 23B court's underlying findings or show how they are clearly erroneous. See
State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 12, 164 P.3d 397 (accepting trial court's findings as
conclusive where appellant failed to marshal evidence). Rather, he only cursorily argues that
"the Rule 23B court erred in each of the above instances in finding no ineffectiveness on the
part of Mr. Caine." Br. Aplt. 54. He then asserts with no analysis that "the Rule 23B court
also clearly erred in making a finding that Mr. Lovell had not proven the requisite prejudice
in that [there] was a substantial likelihood that his decision to plead would have been
different." Br. Aplt. 54-55. In this section of his brief, Lovell does not even cite to
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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), or set forth his heavy burden for showing
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
In effect, Lovell has asked this Court to craft his argument for him. As it has in the
past, the Court should refuse to do so. State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, \ 61 n.7,57 P.3d 977 ("As
we have repeatedly reminded, this court is not simply a depository in which the appealing
party may dump the burden of argument and research"); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,489
(Utah 1988) ("This Court will not engage in constructing arguments out of whole cloth on
behalf of defendants in capital cases") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),
overruled on other grounds, State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994).
In view of 1 ovclF's briefing failures on this point, this Court should affirm,,, the 23B
court's ruling that plea counsel was constitutionally effective.
3. In any event, Lovell has not shown that his counsel was ineffective
To prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness claim, Lovell must "show that
counsel's performance was deficient" and that "the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984). A failure to establish either
element defeats an ineffectiveness claim. See id. at 687, 697.
To satisfy the first Strickland element, Lovell "must show that counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at
688. To prove deficient performance, Lovell must overcome a strong presumption that his
plea counsel's advice was sound strategy. Id. at 687-88, 690.
To satisfy the second Strickland element, Lovell must show that "but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result in the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694.
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As explained, in the context of a guilty plea, Lovell "must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, A1A U.S. 52, 59 (1985). This prejudice inquiry
turns, in large part, on the likelihood that Lovell could have succeeded if he had gone to trial.
Id. at 59-60. That determination is made objectively, disregarding the "'idiosyncrasies of the
particular decision-maker.'" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 95).
Lovell has not satisfied either Strickland element. Distilled to their essence, Lovell's
ineffectiveness claims are that his plea counsel (1) did not adequately investigate or conduct
discovery of other possible perpetrators before advising him to plead guilty; (2) caused him
to make damaging disclosures to law enforcement before securing a plea agreement; (3) did
not discover soon enough that Lovell could not find Ms. Yost's remains; and (4) improperly
promised him that the sentencing judge would not impose death if he waived the jury.
R2957-68.
Lovell did not prove either Strickland element on any of those claims. First, the 23B
court found that Lovell did not prove that his attorney inadequately investigated guilt issues.
R2957. The 23B court found that it was not unreasonable for Lovell's attorney to limit his
investigation as to Lovell's guilt where Lovell told his attorney that he had kidnapped and
murdered Ms. Yost and where the State had Lovell's taped confession. Id. The 23B court
relied on Lovell's counsel's testimony that, in light of that incriminating evidence, he did not
consider information about other perpetrators to be important. Id. The 23B court also found
13

Lovell has apparently abandoned his fifth ineffectiveness claim that his counsel
failed to sufficiently question Rhonda Buttars during the penalty phase regarding her
participation in the crime and her dealings with the State. R2968.
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that Lovell had not shown prejudice where his decision to plead guilty was clearly unrelated
to counsel's alleged deficiency.

R2957-58.

Second, the 23B court found that Lovell had not shown that his counsel caused him to
make damaging disclosures to law enforcement before he had a plea agreement. R2960.
Lovell argued below and argues here that his attorney erroneously told him during plea
negotiations that, if he could not find Ms. Yost's body, the State could not use any
information he gave them in the process of looking for her. R2959-60. But the 23B court
disbelieved Lovell's testimony on this point, instead crediting his attorney's testimony 'that
he expressly told Lovell that anything he said to law enforcement could be used against him
if the plea agreement fell through." R2960. The 23B court also found that Lovell was not
prejudiced by the alleged error where "the evidence clearly preponderates that he pleaded
guilty for other more compelling reasons." R2959. Lovell does not challenge the 23B
court's credibility or no-prejudice findings as clearly erroneous.
Third, the 23B court found that counsel neither performed deficiently nor
prejudicially by not discovering early on that Lovell would be unable to lead police to Ms.
Yost's body because he merely covered her with leaves. R2962-64. Counsel did not
perform deficiently, because Lovell assured his counsel that he was "absolutely certain" that
he could find Ms. Yost's body. R2963. Moreover, Lovell testified in the penalty phase that
he had returned and buried Ms. Yost with a shovel. R1247. In any event, Lovell has not
shown prejudice where his inability to find the body did not cause him to plead guilty.
Lovell was well aware that his failure to find the body voided the Memorandum of
Understanding. Yet, he chose to plead guilty anyway.
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Fourth, the 23 B court found that counsel did not promise Lovell that the sentencing
judge would not impose the death penalty. R2964-68. Lovell has not marshaled the
evidence or shown how that finding was clearly erroneous. See Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 12
(party challenging findings for clear error must marshal evidence). And even if counsel had
made such a promise, Lovell has not shown how he was prejudiced. While such a promise
might be an inducement to waive the sentencing jury, it would not be an inducement to plead
guilty. Thus, Lovell has not shown that but for this alleged error, "there is a reasonable
probability" that "he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial." Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.
In short, Lovell has not shown how the 23B court's ineffectiveness ruling on any of
his claims was wrong.
B.

Lovell has not shown his counsel was ineffective with respect to his plea
for not hiring mitigation experts and an investigator for the penalty
phase.
Lovell argues that his attorney was ineffective with respect to his guilty plea because

he did not hire mitigation experts and an investigator for his sentencing hearing. Br. Aplt.
57. Lovell argues that the ABA Guidelines required his counsel to hire these experts before
advising him to plead guilty. Id. at 57-58. Lovell asserts that he was "terribly prejudiced"
by this inaction because without "mitigation investigation or expert evaluation, [he] was left
with nowhere to go but plead to whatever was offered." Id. at 59. He then cites to extrarecord "mental health and drug abuse evidence," that he claims suggests "brain damage and
severe psychological issues." Id. at 59-60.
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The 23B court declined to consider this issue because it concluded that it was
irrelevant to the motions to withdraw the plea. The 23B court was correct. Whatever
preparations counsel did or did not make in anticipation of the penalty phase had nothing to
do with Lovell's motions to withdraw his pleas. Lovell has never proved that counsel's lack
of penalty-phase preparation prompted him to plea guilty and rush to the penalty phase for
which he now claims his counsel was ill-prepared.
Lovell misleadingly suggests that his counsel did nothing and that this in effect boxed
him into pleading guilty. Br. Aplt. 59-60. In fact, counsel recognized from almost the
beginning that the only leverage the defense had for avoiding a death sentence was to
produce Ms. Yost's identifiable remains. Counsel also recognized that Lovell had no chance
of succeeding at a guilt-phase if the jury heard his confessions andButtars' testimony. Thus,
his strategy focused on these key issues. Counsel therefore moved to suppress the taped
confessions and, while the admissibility of that evidence was uncertain, negotiated with the
prosecution for a plea agreement if Lovell could produce Ms. Yost's remains. See R80,116,
160-62,166, 185, 244-46, 657-58, 1795-96.
The foregoing demonstrates that if Lovell was boxed in, it was by his own actions, not
by his counsel's mistakes. He was the one who confessed to Ms. Yost's murder on tape and
he was the one who failed to produce the body, despite his boast that he could find it "in a
snowstorm." Rl 795. Thus, at that point, his only hope for saving his life was to plead guilty
and hope that the sentencing judge would view him as a remorseful, changed man. Hence,
he told the plea court that he wanted "to make a clean breast of things" and to spare his and
Ms. Yost's family from a painful trial. R663-64.
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Counsel's hiring mitigation experts and a sentencing investigator would not have
changed that plea strategy. At most, it would have only affected the evidence presented at
the sentencing hearing. Lovell, therefore, has not shown how any alleged deficiency in
counsel's sentencing hearing would have caused him not to plead guilty.14
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted O c t o b e r ^ , 2008.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

LAURA B . D C P A I X

Lssistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee

14

As the 23B court noted, this claim would be more properly raised in Lovell's
pending post-conviction petition. R2956. But as a point of clarification, the failure to follow
the ABA Guidelines alone does not prove deficient performance under Strickland. See
Lafferty v. State, 2007 UT 73,ffif32-35,175 P.3d 530. The State also notes that Lovell relies
in part on the 2003 ABA Guidelines. Br. Aplt. 57. The 2003 ABA Guidelines are irrelevant
because they were not in effect when Lovell pled guilty. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.
510, 523-24 (2003) (holding that courts must assess counsel's decisions from 'counsel's
perspective at the time,'" and referring to the ABA Guidelines in effect during Wiggins'
trial) (citation omitted).
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ADDENDUM A
Statutes and Rules

Version applicable in 1993

77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea.
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause
shown and with leave of the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by
motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea.
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
History: C. 1953, 77-13-6, enacted by L.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1989, ch. 65, § 1; 1994, ch. ment, effective May 2,1994, substituted "Rule
16, $ 1.
65B* for "Rule 65B(iT in Subsection (3).

Current version

§ 77-13-6.

Withdrawal of plea

(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the
court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea
held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced.
Sentence may not be announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held
in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 days of
pleading guilty or no contest
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified
in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78, Chapter 35a, PostConviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1989, c. 65, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 16, § 1; Laws 2003, c. 290,
§ 1, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2004, c. 90, § 91, eff. May 3, 2004.

R U L E 1 1 . PLEAS
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant'shall*be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court The
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a
reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b^ A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not
guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
set for trial* A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an
early trial. In cases other than felonies the courtshall advise the defendant, or
counsel, *of the requirements for making a written demand for a juiy trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept &. plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(e)(1) i3F the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly
waived the righj to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; *
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
which thfe plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden df proving each of thosp elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
the plea is an admission of alj those elemeiits;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual oasis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or/
if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;'
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may
be imposed fof each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility
of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and i£so, what agreement has been reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion
to withdraw the plea; ai\d
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has
established that the defendant has read, understood, and- acknowledged the
contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English
language, it wilhbe sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to
the defendant

(con't on next page)

Rule 11
Unless specifically required by statute or rule; a court is not required to
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a ple^
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion feft
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not la ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to majj;#
a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g) If the defendant pleads guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally HI to ^J
misdemeanor" crime* of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code Section
77-3 6-1,r the court shall advise the -defendant orally or in writing that, a s ^
result of the plea, it is unlawful for the defendant to possess, receive o&
transport any firearm or ammunition. The failure to advise does not render tha)
plea invalid or form th? basis for withdrawal of the plea*
(h)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser include^
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved dr
rejected by the court
(h)(2)' If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentenefcf.
is not binding on the court.
(i)(l) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any ple§,
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
(i)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been, reached, the judge, uppn
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and
the reasons for it, in advance of the time "for tender of the plea. The judge maythen indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the
proposed disposition will be approved.
(i)(3) If the judge then decides, that final disposition should not be in,
conformity with the plea agreement, the jud^e shall advise the defendant and
then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(j) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defen;
dant may enter a ^conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, oi no
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment^ to a
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion A
defendant'who prevails "on'appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(k) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with
Utah Code Aim. § 77-16a-103,
(/ ) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record
as a whole. Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does
not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this
rule is not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty ple^
[Amended effective May 1, 1993*, January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; November 1.
2001; November 1, 2002; April 1, 2005; November 1, 2005; January 1, 20084
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This case is before the court on remand under rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. The Utah Supreme Court has directed this court to address the merits of Douglas A.
Lovell's motion to withdraw his guilty plea to aggravated murder. Lovell claims, first, the trial
court failed to strictly comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, before accepting
his plea and, second, his lawyer gave him ineffective assistance of counsel before he entered his
plea. The motion is denied.

BACKGROUND
On April 4, 1985, Lovell kidnapped and raped Joyce Yost. The State charged Lovell with
one count each of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, and forcible sodomy. Prior
to the preliminary hearing, Lovell paid two people on separate occasions to murder Ms. Yost to
prevent herfromtestifying. Neither person hired to commit the murder followed through,
however. At LovelPs preliminary hearing, Ms. Yost testified against Lovell, and the magistrate
bound him over for trial on the charged offenses.
Following his futile attempts to hire someone to kill Ms. Yost, Lovell decided to kill her
himself. He enlisted the assistance of his estranged wife, Rhonda Buttars, to drive him to Ms.
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Yost's apartment around midnight on the evening of August 10,1985. After dropping off Lovell,
Buttars drove home and went to bed. Lovell entered Ms. Yost's apartment, kidnapped her at
knife-point, and drove her to a canyon outside of Ogden, where he strangled her to death. Lovell
covered her body with leaves and branches until approximately a month later, when he returned
to the murder scene and, using his hands and a shovel, buried Ms. Yost in a shallow grave.
On December 13,1985, the State secured convictions against Lovell for kidnapping and
sexually assaulting Ms. Yost, based upon her sworn preliminary hearing testimony before her
disappearance.
In 1991, Detective Terry Carpenter, of the South Ogden City police department,
interviewed Buttars in connection with the presumed death of Ms. Yost. Based on information
Buttars provided, Carpenter went to the Utah State Prison to interview Lovell and to offer a plea
agreement of no death penalty if Lovell would plead guilty and could produce Ms. Yost's body.
When Lovell remained uncooperative, Carpenter persuaded Buttars to visit Lovell in prison
while wearing an audio-recording device. Lovell made clear, incriminating statements relating to
Ms. Yost's death.1 On May 14, 1992, the State charged Lovell with the aggravated murder and
aggravated kidnapping of Ms. Yost.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 28,1993, the day of his scheduled trial, Lovell pleaded guilty to one count of
"I committed a first degree felony to cover another felony. It's the death penalty. At the very least they're
going to give me life without parole. If I cooperate with them and go to them, they're going to give me life without
parole."
*** *
"I premeditated-premeditated. I planned to kill Joyce. I planned to end Joyce's life. That's premeditated
capital homicide." (R. 897-98)
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aggravated murder for killing Joyce Yost in exchange for a dismissal of the aggravated
kidnapping charge. In accepting the plea, the trial court informed Lovell of his right to file a
motion to withdraw the plea within 30 days of entering his plea, consistent with the prevailing
interpretation of the governing statute.2
On August 18,1993, Judge Stanton M. Taylor entered judgment and sentenced Lovell to
death. Lovell filed a motion to withdraw his plea dated August 25,1993, which the trial court
received on August 29,1993. Lovell's counsel filed a notice of appeal on August 30,1993.
The trial court held a hearing on September 20,1993, to address Lovell's request to
discharge his lawyer and to withdraw his guilty plea. To allow him time to engage new counsel,
the court deferred ruling on the motion to withdraw the plea. Thereafter, the motion was
repeatedly postponed.
In July 1994, the State moved to dismiss the motion to withdraw the guilty plea on the
ground of failure to prosecute. Further, the State contended that "the filing of the appeal has
effectively deprived [the trial court] of jurisdiction in the case unless the Supreme Court agrees to
remand." Lovell's counsel essentially agreed and opined that rule 23B of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure permitted the supreme court to restore limited jurisdiction to the trial court
to consider the motion. Based on the parties' joint conclusion that the trial court was without
jurisdiction to consider the motion, the trial court declined to rule on the motion to dismiss and

2

The Utah Court of Appeals held in State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578 (1992) that section 77-13-6's thirty-day
limitation period for filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea ran from the date of the plea colloquy. See id at 582
("Defendant's pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, filed thirty-one days after the entry of defendant's guilty
plea, [is] clearly untimely.").
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the motion to withdraw the plea.
Lovell later filed a motion in the Utah Supreme Court for a remand to consider Ms motion
to withdraw his guilty plea and a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Lovell predicated his
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on an allegation of a conflict of interest between his
lawyer, John T. Caine, and the Weber County attorney, Reed M. Richards. The supreme court
remanded the case to the trial court in 1996 to address Lovell's allegation of a conflict of interest
only. In doing so, the supreme court stated, "No other issue shall be addressed on the remand, but
may be addressed in any appropriate subsequent proceeding." Thus, the trial court had no
jurisdiction to consider anything else, such as the motion to withdraw the plea.
Lovell also moved to disqualify Judge Taylor, who voluntarily stepped aside. Judge
Michael D. Lyon, the next judge in rotation, succeeded Judge Taylor as trial judge and proceeded
with the remand.
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Lovell's claim of conflict of interest,
entered its findings of fact in March 1997, and concluded that no actual conflict of interest
adversely affected Lovell's attorney's performance.
In his appeal, Lovell challenged his conviction, the death sentence, and the trial court's
finding that trial counsel had not been ineffective; but he never raised on appeal his motion to
withdraw his plea. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed Lovell's conviction and sentence of death.
State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, \ 47, 948 P.2d 382 {Lovell I).
On October 22, 2002, Lovell renewed his motion to withdraw his plea, based on alleged
violations of rule 11(e)(7) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the United States
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Constitution, and the Utah Constitution. The trial court dismissed the motion, based, in part, on
State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the 30-day period in which
to move to withdraw a guilty plea begins on the date a defendant enters his plea). The trial court
further concluded that the filing of an appeal deprived the court of jurisdiction to consider the
motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
On April 12, 2005, the Utah Supreme Court reversed and held that Loveil's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea was timely filed under State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528, which,
in the interim, had reversed State v. Price. See Ostler, 2001 UT 68 at \l 1 (holding that the 30day period to file a motion to withdraw the plea begins at sentencing). The supreme court
remanded the case to the trial court on April 12,2005, to address the merits of the motion to
withdraw the guilty plea.
Following preparation by both sides, the trial court convened hearings on November 14,
15, and 16,2005, to receive evidence relevant to Loveil's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
After the November 2005 hearings, but prior to any briefing on the motion to withdraw the plea,
Lovellfileda motion to have the trial court reconsider a ruling on the proffered testimony from
Rhonda Buttars, which the court had excludedfromthe November hearing. Both sides briefed
the issue, and the court heard oral argument on the motion on April 5, 2006. The trial court
issued its ruling on April 28, 2006, denying Lovell's motion and affirming its prior ruling that
Buttars' testimony was irrelevant to the motion to withdraw Lovell's plea. Thereafter, the
lawyers briefed the issues relating to the motion to withdraw7 the plea, and the court heard oral
arguments on the motion on August 11,2006.
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Thomas B. Brunker and Christopher D. Ballard from the Utah Attorney General's office
represented the State, assisted by William F. Daines and Gary R. Heward from the Weber County
Attorney's office. James M. Retallick and Ryan J. Bushell represented Douglas Lovell, who was
present at all hearings.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Lovell contends that the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11 in accepting his
guilty plea and that his lawyer failed to provide effective assistance of counsel during the pleataking process and in the representation leading up to his entering his guilty plea.
Lovell's motion presents four issues to the court: First, has Lovell demonstrated "good
cause" to withdraw his guilty plea under the version of section 77-13-6 in effect at the time he
pleaded guilty on June 28,1993?3 Specifically, has Lovell demonstrated that the trial judge failed
to strictly comply with rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in taking his guilty plea.
Second, has Lovell demonstrated that he suffered prejudice as a result of any failure to strictly
comply with rule 11? Third, has Lovell demonstrated that his guilty plea was not "knowingly and
voluntarily made" under the current version of section 77-13-6.4 Fourth, did trial counsel fail to
3

In 1993, section 77-13-6 read as follows:
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and
with leave of the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion, and shall be
made within 30 days after the entry of the plea.
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under Rule 65B(i),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
4

The current version of section 77-13-6 reads as follows:
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a
showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
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provide effective legal representation leading up to and during the taking of Lovell's plea?
In making its analysis of these issues in this decision, the trial court has relied on facts
from the record, including this court's March 21,1997 Findings of Fact on a prior 23B hearing
on remand, and the trial court's findings from an evidentiary hearing the trial court conducted on
November 14,15, and 16,2005, on Lovell's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
ANALYSIS
I. The Claim that the Trial Court's Plea Colloquy Failed to Strictly Comply with Rule 11
Lovell first argues that the Statement of Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty ("Plea
Statement") and the trial judge's plea colloquy failed to properly advise him of all of the
requirements of rule 11. According to Lovell, the trial judge failed to ascertain that he was aware
of and understood his right to the presumption of innocence, his right against self-incrimination,
his right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, his right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, and his right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses. In addition, Lovell
contends that the trial judge either failed to inform, or misinformed, him of the nature and
elements of the offense, that the burden was upon the prosecution to prove each element beyond
a reasonable doubt, of his right to a unanimous jury verdict, of the limited nature of his appeal
rights, of the correct standard for determining when a sentence of death should be imposed, and

(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held in
abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may not be announced
unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be
made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest.
(3) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in Subsection
(2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction Remedies Act and Rule 65C,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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of the time limits for filing a motion to withdraw his plea. Finally, Lovell argues that the trial
judge failed to ensure that he fully understood the plea agreement that had been negotiated with
the State.5 For all of these reasons, Lovell claims that there was a failure to strictly comply with
rule 11 and, therefore, that he has shown good cause to withdraw his guilty plea. Furthermore,
Lovell also argues that the "same omissions and mistakes in taking the plea not only apply to the
statute in effect at the time of the taking of the plea, but also apply if the same [plea] colloquy
were given under the current version of [section] 77-13-6." Def s Reply Mem. at 10.
According to Lovell, because "[n]on-compliance with Rule 11 infringes on [his] constitutional>
rights ..., he could not have knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea." Id.
The court disagrees with Lovell's claims.
A. Rule 11
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth the procedure for entering
guilty pleas. "The purpose of rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know their rights and
understand the basic consequences of their decision to plead guilty." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63,
^[9, 95 P.3d 276. This purpose is satisfied when "the record adequately supports the . . .
conclusion that the defendant had a conceptual understanding of each of the elements of rule

5

Lovell contends that, as a result of confusing discussion about the plea agreement at the change-of-plea
hearing, the precise content of the plea agreement was unclear. He asserts that it was Caine's position that Lovell
would have the benefit of the State removing the death penalty as a sentencing option at any point in the proceedings
if Ms. Yost's remains were produced. On the other hand, the Memorandum of Understanding contemplated that the
prosecution would not present aggravating factors at the penalty phase if Lovell found Ms. Yost's remains. Lovell
contends that to the extent he "believed that he could produce the remains at any point in the penalty proceeding and
still obtain the benefit of the bargain, the prosecutions's bargain was illusory, because once the prosecution began
presenting aggravating evidence, there was no way for them to perform their end of the bargain." Def s Mem. in
Supp. at 17.
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11(e)." State v. Cornell, 2005 UT 28, Tfl8,114 P.3d 569. The responsibility of ensuring
compliance with rule 11 falls to the trial judge. See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,1312 (Utah
1987) ("Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and
Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered."). The Utah Supreme
Court has ''described the [trial] court's duty in this regard as a duty of 'strict' compliance." State
v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, Tfl 1,22 P.3d 1242. "This 'strict compliance' rule requires the trial court
to establish (1) that 'the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary,' and (2) that 'the
defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights and understood the elements of the
crime.'" State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, fl 1,983 P.2d 556 (quoting State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d
993, 995 (Utah 1993)).
However, "[although the phrase might suggest otherwise, strict compliance with rule
11 (e) does not require that a district court follow a 'particular script' or any other 'specific
method of communicating therightsenumerated by rule 11.'" Cornell, 2005 UT 28 at ^[12
(quoting Visser, 2000 UT 88 at ^[13). Rather, "strict compliance can be accomplished by
multiple means so long as no requirement of the rule is omitted and so long as the record reflects
that the requirement has been fulfilled." State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 1992). Rule
11 itself indicates that a trial court's findings "may be based on questioning of the defendant on
the record or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that
the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement" Utah R.
Crim. P. 11(e). In addition, the Utah Supreme Court has held that rule 11 "does not prevent a
courtfromtaking into account other record factors in making its findings . . . including 'the
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contents of other documents such as the information, presentence reports, exhibits, etc.,'" Visser,
2000 UT 88 at f 12 (quoting Maguire, 830 P.2d at 218), as well as a defendant's "personal trial
experience." Id at % 13.
B. "Good Cause" Standard Under Prior Section 77-13-6
At the time Lovell entered his guilty plea to capital murder, Utah law allowed a defendant
to withdraw a plea of guilty "upon good cause shown and with leave of the court." Utah Code
Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (1993). Although withdrawal of a guilty plea is a privilege, not a right, and
is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, see State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040,1041 (Utah
1987), a defendant could generally show good cause by claiming that the court in accepting his
plea violated rule 11 and, therefore, he or she entered a plea either unintelligently or
involuntarily.
Utah appellate courts have repeatedly held that a "trial court's failure to comply strictly
with Rule 1 1 . . . in accepting a guilty plea is good cause, as a matter of law, for the withdrawal
of that plea." State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); see also Bluemel v.
State, 2006 UT App 141, ^f 10, 134 P.3d 181 (harm is presumed when a trial judge fails to inform
a defendant of his constitutional rights); State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah Ct. App.
1994) (same); State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470,476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (same); State v. Valencia,
116 P.2d 1332,1334-35 (Utah App. 1989) (same). This would include, of course, evidence that
the plea was not voluntary, or that the defendant did not sufficiently understand the rights he was
waiving by pleading guilty, the elements of his crime, or the minimum and maximum sentences
that could be imposed for his offense.
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Moreover, although strict compliance with rule 11 creates a presumption that a guilty plea
was taken knowingly and voluntarily, a "trial court's compliance with rule 11 does not foreclose
the possibility the court can abuse its discretion in refusing defendant's motion if his plea was in
fact involuntary." State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).6 Indeed, any
convincing, credible evidence that a defendant's exercise of free judgment was overcome by
duress, coercion, or improper inducement would constitute good cause for granting a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea. See State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337, 338 (Utah 1977).
C. "Knowing and Voluntary" Standard Under Present Section 77-13-6
The current statute governing the withdrawal of guilty pleas abrogated the "good cause"
language and now simply states that a uplea of guilty... may be withdrawn only upon leave of
the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code Ann. § 7713-6(2)(a) (2005). The State argues that the phrase "knowingly and voluntarily" is a term of art
and refers exclusively to the waiver of core federal constitutional rights, namely, the right to the
privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, the right to confront witnesses, and
the right to an explanation of the law in relation to the facts of the case (i.e., an explanation of the
elements of the crime and the existence of a sufficient factual basis for the offense). See State's
Mem. in Opp. at 53 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969)).
According to the State,

The Court in Thorup went on to say that
[wjhen the plea is entered in the presence of counsel, following the execution and review by the
court of an affidavit which meets the requirements of Rule 11 and where the defendant, both in
affidavit and in colloquy with the court, denies the plea was a result of threats, promises, or
coercion, there is persuasive evidence the plea was voluntary.
State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

Memorandum Decision
Case No. 921900407
Page 12
to obtain relief under the present statute . . . Lovell must prove a defect in his
understanding and waiver of these rights, or that the plea was not supported by a
sufficient factual basis. Rule 11 violations that [do] not affect Lovell's waiver of
one of the rights identified in Boykin will not suffice.
Id However, the State provides no argument demonstrating that the Utah legislature intended
that the "knowingly and voluntarily" phrase would be so narrowly construed.7 Indeed, one would
expect that if this phrase was meant to refer only to the waiver of constitutional rights, because it
is used in a Utah statute, it would refer not simply to the waiver of rights under the federal
constitution, but also to rights under the Utah constitution as well. This would include rights not
mentioned in Boykin, such as the right to an impartial jury, the right to compel the attendance of
defense witnesses, see Utah Const, art. I, sec. 12, and the right to require the State to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Lopez, 1999 UT 24, If 13, 980 P.2d 191 (holding that the
due process clause in article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution "requires that the prosecution
prove every element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt").
Furthermore, the State has provided no argument showing that the "knowingly aind
voluntarily" phrase was intended by the legislature to apply exclusively to the waiver of
constitutional rights rather than in its more generic form as simply the process of ensuring that a
defendant understands the significance and consequences of a particular decision. See Godinez v.
Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 n.12 (1993) ("The purpose of the 'knowing and voluntary' inquiry . . .
is to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and
The State correctly points out that neither the state or federal constitution mandates compliance with rule
11. Therefore, "a failure to comply with Utah's rule 11 in taking a guilty plea does not in itself amount to a violation
of a defendant's rights under either the Utah or the United States Constitution." Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988,
992 (Utah 1993). But this argument sheds no light on the scope of the "knowing and voluntary" language used by
the legislature in section 77-13-6
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consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced.") (emphasis in
original removed). Finally, if the State's position is correct, then it is possible to find that a
defendant has failed to comprehend important elements of rule 11, such as the maximum and
minimum penalties and that the prosecution has the burden of proving all the elements of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and still conclude that he has knowingly entered a guilty plea.
Such an outcome would clearly be inconsistent with Utah Supreme Court decisions holding that
the purpose of strict compliance is to establish that a defendant has a "conceptual understanding
of each of the elements of rule 11," Corwell, 2005 UT 28 at \ 18 (emphasis added), and,
therefore, that his "guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary." Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995.
Based upon this analysis, the court concludes that the legislature did not intend the
"knowingly and voluntarily" phrase in section 77-13-6 to narrowly apply solely to waivers of
federal constitutional rights, which would render significant portions of rule 11 essentially
unnecessary or superfluous to the plea-taking process. Rather, the court concludes that the
"knowingly and voluntarily" language is best viewed as a requirement to inquire whether a
defendant has a conceptual understanding of each of the elements of rule 11 and, therefore, that
the defendant comprehends the overall significance and consequences of his decision to plead
guilty.
D. Court's Analysis Applies to Both the Former and Current Standards
While there may be legal differences between the good-cause standard and the knowingand-voluntary standard, as a practical matter evidence in support of good cause to withdraw a
guilty plea will often also support a showing that a guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily
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entered. Indeed, as previously noted, Lovell contends that the "same omissions and mistakes in
taking the plea not only apply to the statute in effect at the time of the taking of the plea., but also
apply if the same colloquy were given under the current version of [section] 77-13-6." Def s
Reply Mem. at 10. Thus, the court's consideration of whether the trial judge strictly complied
with rule 11, as well as the court's inquiry into whether Lovell suffered prejudice if rule 11 was
not strictly complied with, will apply to both the good-cause standard under former section 7713-6 and the knowing-and-voluntary standard under the current statute.
1. Strict Compliance with Rule 11
Under the 1993 version of section 77-13-6, Lovell argues that neither the Plea Statement
nor the trial judge's plea colloquy, even when viewed jointly, strictly satisfied the requirements
of rule 11. A fair reading of the transcript of the plea colloquy shows that the trial judge clearly
ascertained that Lovell had read and signed the Plea Statement and that he fully understood the
nature and provisions of the plea agreement.8 See Def s Plea Colloquy at 2-5, 7-8,15. The trial
judge questioned Lovell in order to make certain that his decision to enter a guilty plea was not
the result of threats or coercion, that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and that

The transcript of the plea colloquy belies Lovell's contention that there was confusion about the content of
the plea agreement between the State and him that formed the basis of his guilty plea. First, the parties brought to
the court's attention the Memorandum of Understanding and made a part of the record simply as important
background information to fully apprise the trial judge of the chronology of the plea bargaining process. Second, no
confusion existed about whether the Memorandum of Understanding was in effect at the time Lovell entered his
guilty plea. It was not. The record clearly shows that Lovell had failed to locate Ms. Yost's remains and, therefore,
the original plea agreement failed on its own terms. Accordingly, Lovell was under no obligation to plead guilty, and
the State was alsofreeto seek the death penalty against Lovell. Third, despite having no obligation to plead guilty,
the plea colloquy clearly shows that Lovell pressed forward with his desire to plead guilty to aggravated murder in
exchange for the State's dismissal of the aggravated kidnapping charge, but also knowing that he would still have the
benefit of the State removing the death penalty as a sentencing option if Ms. Yost's remains could be found prior to
tne start of the penalty phase.
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he had no mental problems that would interfere with his entering a guilty plea. See id, at 8-9.
The trial judge further ensured that Lovell understood his right to be tried by a jury, see
id. at 12,17, his right against compulsory self-incrimination, see id. at 13,18, his right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, see id. at 12,18, and that by pleading guilty he would
forego all of these rights. In addition, the trial judge made certain through careful questioning
that Lovell understood the nature and elements of the offense of aggravated murder, see id. at 1820,27 (including the element of intent); that the prosecution bore the burden of proving each
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, see id. at 12,18,26; that a plea of guilty was
an admission of all the elements of the offense, see id. at 5-6; and that the maximum penalty for
the offense of aggravated murder was death and the minimum penalty was life in prison with
parole. See id. at 6, 7, 33.
After Caine set forth a factual basis for the plea detailing the offense of aggravated
murder committed by Lovell, the trial judge elicited Lovell's acknowledgment that Caine's
factual recitation was correct. See id. at 22-24. Finally, the trial judge clearly advised Lovell that
if he pleaded guilty, his right of appeal would be limited, that in the event he were sentenced to
death for his crime, there would be a mandatory, automatic appeal to the Utah Supreme Court,
and that, if he changed his mind about pleading guilty and wanted to go to trial, he would have to
file a motion to set aside the plea within 30 days. See id. at 13-14,18.
Notwithstanding the trial judge's careful questioning, the language of the plea colloquy
indicates that the trial judge complied with an outdated version of rule 11. Approximately one
month prior to Lovell entering his guilty plea, the Utah Supreme Court amended rule 11 by
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adding two specific rights and enlarging a third: (1) the right to the presumption of innocence, (2)
the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and (3) the right to a speedy public trial
before an impartial jury. Although the trial judge verbally informed Lovell of all the required
elements of the previous rule 11, nowhere did the plea colloquy or the Plea Statement expressly
inform Lovell that he had the right to the presumption of innocence, the right to compel the
attendance of defense witnesses, and the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury.
Nevertheless, as previously noted, the Utah Supreme Court has specifically held that
"[sjtrict compliance does not require a specific method of communicating the rights enumerated
by rule 11," Visser, 2000 UT 88 at ^ 13, and that strict compliance is accomplished when "the
'record reflects that the [rule 11] requirements have been fulfilled."' Id. (quoting Maguire, 830
P.2d at 218) (bracketed phrase in original).
Based upon the record in the present case, the court finds that, while certain rights were
not literally communicated to Lovell, in light of his personal trial experience and the overall
context in which the plea was taken, the rights omitted from the Plea Statement and the plea
colloquy were sufficiently communicated to Lovell to give him a conceptual understanding of
those rights. See Visser, 2000 UT 88 at \ 13 ("We conclude that [the defendant's personal trial]
experience communicated at least as much as would the mere oral recitation of the c right to a
speedy public trial before an impartial jury.'"). The record shows that at the time Lovell pleaded
guilty, he was not a stranger to the criminal justice system. He had previously been convicted on
a charge of aggravated robbery in 1978 and, in 1986, he was tried and convicted by a jury of the
aggravated sexual assault of Ms. Yost. Therefore, given Lovell's trial experience, it is reasonable

P.QQ7
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that he had a conceptual understanding of the rights to the presumption of innocence, to compel
the attendance of defense witnesses, and to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury.
The record shows that during the plea colloquy, the trial judge fully informed Lovell that
the State bore the responsibility of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Clearly, the State
would have no burden to prove guilt if there was no presumption of innocence. See In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) ("The reasonable-doubt standard... provides concrete
substance for the presumption of innocence."). Strict compliance does not require rote use of
precise words. Furthermore, having been a defendant in two prior felony trials that resulted in
guilty jury verdicts, Lovell was certainly present when standard jury instructions were presented
explaining to jurors that he was presumed to be innocent of his alleged crime until the jurors
were persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty.
The record also demonstrates that Lovell was well aware of his right to compel the
attendance of witnesses to testify on his behalf. At the November 2005 evidentiary hearings,
Lovell testified that following the change-of-plea hearing in 1993, he and Caine began preparing
for the penalty phase of his trial. This includedfindingwitnesses to testify for him. Moreover,
during the change-of-plea hearing itself, when the trial judge began discussing the date on which
the penalty phase of the trial would begin, Caine informed the court that on Tuesday or
Wednesday of the following week "[w]e would be able to have our-the people that we would
intend to call ready at that point." Def s Plea Colloquy at 29. The court finds that Lovell had a
conceptual understanding of his right to call witnesses to testify on his behalf.
Finally, the record shows that Lovell was also aware of his right to a speedy public trial
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before an impartial jury. On the very day he pleaded guilty, he knew he was scheduled to start
jury selection and proceed to trial, but he elected instead to change his plea. See Def s Plea
Colloquy at 2. He was certainly aware that had he decided not to plead guilty, jury selection
would have commenced and the trial would have proceeded forward. Because Lovell pleaded
guilty on the very day he knew he was scheduled to proceed to trial, the right to a speedy trial
was adequately communicated to him. See Corwell, 2005 UT 28 at f 19 (the fact that trial is
scheduled to begin just one day after the day on which a guilty plea is entered supports a finding
that the right to a speedy trial has been adequately communicated).
In addition, Lovell was aware that his trial would be public. His previous trial experience
clearly bears this out, and Lovell admitted during the evidentiary hearing that he knew his trial
would be public, not convened in a secret proceeding. Lastly, Lovell understood that he was
entitled to be tried by an impartial jury. At least with respect to the trial in which he was
convicted of aggravated sexual assault, Lovell participated in selecting an unbiased jury. As
noted by the Utah Supreme Court, "the experience of witnessing and participating injury
selection communicate[s] the manner of providing an impartial jury." Visser, 2000 UT 88 at \
16. Therefore, at the time Lovell entered his guilty plea he was cognizant of his right to be tried
by an impartial jury.
A careful review of the record in the case convinces the court that all of the requirements
of rule 11 were fulfilled. This was accomplished by either direct verbal communication from the
trial judge or by indirect communication based upon Lovell's personal experience with the
criminal justice system and the overall context in which the plea was taken. Therefore, the court
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concludes as a matter of law that rule 11 was strictly complied with in Lovell's case, and,
therefore, Lovell has not demonstrated good cause to withdraw his guilty plea under the version
of section 77-13-6 that was in effect at the time he entered his plea. Furthermore, because rule
11 was strictly complied with, Lovell has also not shown that his guilty plea was not knowingly
and voluntarily entered under the current version of section 77-13-6.
2. Prejudice Inquiry
Even if Lovell had demonstrated that the trial judge had failed to strictly comply with rule
11, he has not shown that the trial judge's errors prejudiced him, either in terms of showing that
his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary or in terms of showing that, but for the errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty.
a. Presumption of Prejudice
Lovell contends that because the trial judge failed to expressly inform him of three
specific rights listed under rule 11, this court, under the holding of Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT
App 141,134 P.3d 181, must presume prejudice. According to Lovell, a "guilty plea must be
knowingly and voluntarily made in order to protect a defendant's due process rights
[Moreover, it] is well established under Utah law that we will presume h a r m . . . when a trial
court fails to inform a defendant of his constitutional rights under rule 11." Id. at \ 10 (omission
in original) (citation and quotations omitted). Both Lovell and the State believe that the
presumption is irrebuttable, but the court disagrees.
This court believes that the harm presumed in Bluemel is best understood if the court of
appeals reasoning is cast in the form of a syllogism:
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(1) If a trial judge fails to inform a defendant of a particular constitutional right under rule
11, then the defendant is unaware that he is waiving that constitutional right when he
pleads guilty;
(2) If the defendant is unaware that he is waiving a constitutional right under rule 11, then
his guilty plea cannot be knowing and voluntary;
(3) Therefore, if a trial judge fails to inform a defendant of a particular constitutional
right under rule 11, then the defendant's guilty plea cannot be knowing and voluntary.
See id.
Neither the Utah Supreme Court nor the court of appeals has ever directly addressed
whether this presumption of harm was intended to be conclusive or rebuttable.9 However,
several factors strongly suggest that the presumption of harm can be rebutted. First, with respect
to premise (1) of the syllogism, the presumption of harm is conclusive only if it is true that a trial
judge's error in not informing a defendant of his constitutional rights necessarily results in the
defendant being unaware that he is waiving his rights when he pleads guilty. Certainly, if this
were the case, then every time the trial judge committed such an error, the defendant's guilty plea
would not be knowing and voluntary and a conclusive presumption of harm would be warranted.
However, Utah Supreme Court cases addressing rule 11 clearly demonstrate that simply because
a trial judge may fail to verbally inform a defendant of his constitutional rights under rule 11, this
does not justify concluding that the defendant is necessarily unaware of or uninformed about the
constitutional rights he is waiving in pleading guilty.

Legal presumptions are either conclusive or rebuttable. "A conclusive presumption is one in which proof
of basic fact renders the existence of the presume fact conclusive and irrebuttable." Black's Law Dictionary 822
(abridged 6th ed. 1991). On the other hand, a rebuttable presumption is a "presumption that can be overturned upon
the showing of sufficient proof.... Once evidence tending to rebut the presumption is introduced, the force of the
presumption is entirely dissipated." Id
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Consider, for example, the case of State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88,22 P.3d 1242. In that
case, the defendant made the decision to plead guilty after his trial had begun. At the change-ofplea hearing, the trial judge conducted a plea colloquy and informed the defendant of his
constitutional rights including his "right to continue [his] trial through to a jury verdict." Id. at %
4. The trial judge, however, never informed the defendant that he had arightto a "speedy trial"
and an "impartial jury." See id. After the court accepted the defendant's guilty plea, he moved
the following day to withdraw the plea. The trial judge denied the defendant's motion. On
appeal, the court of appeals held that the trial judge failed to strictly comply with rule 11 because
he did not "specifically inform defendant... of hisrightto a speedy trial before an impartial
jury." State v. Visser, 1999 UT App 19,fflf17-18, 973 P.2d 998. On that basis, the court of
appeals reversed the trial judge's denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw. The Utah
Supreme Court subsequently reversed the court of appeals, holding that the defendant's trial
experience prior to entering his guilty plea "communicated at least as much as would the mere
oral recitation of the 'right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury.'" Visser, 2000 UT 88
at ^[13 (citation omitted). Clearly, the failure of the trial judge to verbally inform Lovell of a
constitutional right under rule 11 does not warrant the conclusion that the defendant was
necessarily unaware or lacked an understanding of the constitutionalrightshe was waiving in
pleading guilty. See also Corwell, 2005 UT 28 at \\9 (facts of the case show that defendant had
a conceptual understanding of hisrightto a speedy trial even though the trial judge never verbally
informed him of this right). Because there is no necessary connection between a trial judge's
failure to inform a defendant of his constitutionalrightsunder rule 11 and the conclusion that the
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defendant therefore lacked an understanding of his constitutional rights, the presumption of harm
employed by the court of appeals in Bluemel is one that can be rebutted.
Second, assuming that the court of appeals chose its words advisedly when it rendered
Bluemel, by stating that harm must bz presumed when a trial judge commits the error of failing to
inform a defendant of a constitutional right under rule 11, the court of appeals is at least implying
that the evidence in support of finding harm, namely, the error committed by the trial judge, can
be rebutted by other evidence included in the record. In contradistinction, had the court of
appeals intended to convey that the presumption of harm was conclusive, it would have been
more appropriate for the court of appeals to have stated that a trial judge's failure to inform a
defendant of his constitutional rights under rule 11 constitutes harm per se, rather than simply
that harm must be presumed. Thus, by using the verb presume, the court of appeals has implied
that the evidence in support of a finding of harm may be overcome by other evidence to the
contrary contained in the record.
Finally, considerations of fairness argue in favor of concluding that the presumption of
harm required by the court of appeals in the rule 11 context should be a rebuttable presumption.
Notwithstanding that a trial judge has failed to inform a defendant of a particular constitutional
right under rule 11, if the record shows that the defendant nevertheless had a conceptual
understanding of that constitutional right at the time he pleaded guilty, which is what rule 11
requires, see id. at ^[18, it would be contrary to the interests of justice to nevertheless slavishly
adhere to the legal fiction that the trial judge's error conclusively demonstrates that the defendant
did not have a conceptual understanding of his constitutional rights before pleading guilty. In the
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same way that the court of appeals has said that it "cannot accept an involuntary guilty plea and
still claim to have done justice/5 Bluemel, 2005 UT App 141 at % 10, it would also be
inappropriate to reject a guilty plea shownfromthe record to be knowing and voluntary despite
errors committed by the trial judge and still claim to have done justice.
For all of the foregoing reasons, this court concludes as a matter of law that the
presumption of harm discussed by the court of appeals in the Bluemel case is rebuttable. Thus,
even if Loveil had shown that the trial judge failed to strictly comply with rule 11 and that
prejudice must be presumed, if it can be shownfromthe record that Lovell nevertheless had a
conceptual understanding of the constitutional rights the trial judge failed to inform him about,
there is no legal justification to conclude that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and
that he suffered harm as a result of the trial judge's errors.
Lovell accurately points out that the trial judge failed to expressly inform him of certain
constitutional rights listed under rule 11 and argues, therefore, that under Bluemel this court must
presume that his guilty plea was unknowingly or involuntarily entered, and that ipso facto he is
entitled to withdraw his plea. The court disagrees. Lovell must show prejudice. The record as a
whole demonstrates that in light of Lovell's personal trial experience and the overall context in
which the plea was taken, the rights the trial judge failed to expressly inform him about during
the plea colloquy were sufficiently communicated to Lovell to give him a conceptual
understanding of those rights. Thus, any presumption that Lovell's guilty plea was not knowing
and voluntary is rebutted. Therefore, despite the trial judge's errors, Lovell has not shown good
cause to withdraw his guilty plea under the former version of section 77-13-6 or that his plea was
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not knowingly and voluntarily entered under the current version of the statute.
b. Harmless-Error Standard
In addition to concluding today that the record rebuts any presumed prejudice to Lovell
from errors of the trial judge in the plea-taking process, the court further concludes as a matter of
law that any error of the trial judge is also subject to a harmless-error standard review usually
reserved for errors raised for the first time on appeal. The harm contemplated under the harmlesserror standard is whether the error affected the outcome of the plea proceeding. Rule 30(a) of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure states that "[ajny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does
not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded."
No Utah appellate court has addressed whether rule 11 violations are subject to the
harmless error standard outside the context of a plain error review. In the case of State v. Mora,
2003 UT App 117, 69 P.3d 838, the defendant argued that he should be permitted to withdraw
his guilty plea because the trial judge failed to inform him of his constitutional right to have the
State prove each element of his crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The State, relying upon rule
30, asked the court of appeals to affirm the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that the error committed by the trial court during the pleataking process was harmless. See id. at \ 22. In response, the court of appeals "decline[d] to
determine whether the harmless error doctrine applies to rule 11 violations." Id. The court of
appeals held that it "will presume harm . . . when a trial court fails to inform a defendant of his
constitutional rights under rule 11." Id. Since harm must be presumed, the court of appeals
reasoned that it did not have to consider whether the harmless error doctrine applies to rule 11
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violations.
However, the harm presumed by the court of appeals is not the type of harm contemplated
under the harmless-error standard. In Mora, the court of appeals argued that harm must be
presumed
because, by [the defendant] not knowing which rights [he] is waiving, the
defendant cannot make a fully informed decision. If the defendant is not fully
informed of his rights prior to pleading guilty, then the guilty plea cannot be
voluntary. We cannot accept an involuntary guilty plea and still claim to have
done justice.
Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, the harm presumed by the court of appeals as
a result of the trial judge's error was that the defendant's guilty plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily entered. The harm contemplated under the harmless-error standard, however, is
whether the error affected the outcome of the plea proceeding. See United States v. Benitez, 542
U.S. 74, 81 (2004) (u[T]he standard phrased as cerror that affects substantial rights/ . . . has
previously been taken to mean error with a prejudicial effect on the outcome of a judicial
proceeding."). In the change-of-plea context, that standard is whether there is a reasonable
likelihood that, '"but for' the alleged error, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty." Dean,
2004 UT 63 at ^ 22; see also Mora, 2003 UT App 117 at 122 n.4 (commenting that, in reference
to the harmless-error doctrine, "the issue of whether the defendant would have entered the plea
but for the error would, in most cases, turn in part on the defendant's subjective assertions").
Clearly, there is nothing logically contradictory about claiming that an error committed during
the plea process resulted in a guilty plea that was not knowingly and voluntarily entered (the
harm presumed by the court of appeals) and the claim that the very same error nevertheless had
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no affect on the defendant's ultimate decision to plead guilty (the harm contemplated by the
harmless error standard). While it may be difficult to demonstrate that an alleged error did or did
not have an effect on a defendant's decision to plead guilty, the fact that the error is presumed to
have affected the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea does not warrant the conclusion that
the error necessarily affected the defendant's decision in this regard and, therefore, that the
harmless-error standard does not or should not apply to rule 11 violations. See Benitez, 542 U.S.
at 81 ("It is only for certain structural errors undermining the fairness of a criminal proceeding as
a whole that even preserved error requires reversal without regard to the mistake's effect on the
proceeding.").
Furthermore, addressing the application of the harmless error standard to rule 11
violations, the court of appeals noted in Mora that
[pjrior to the creation of the strict compliance test in Gibbons, Utah appellate
courts applied a 'record as a whole' test to rule 11. As long as the 'record as a
whole' test was used, the harmless error doctrine clearly applied to rule 11
violations. However, it is not clear whether the harmless error doctrine continues
to apply to rule 11 violations after Gibbons.
Mora, 2003 UT App 117 at f 22 n.4. (emphasis added). Over the years the court of appeals has
repeatedly held that the "record as a whole" test no longer applies to assessing compliance with
rule 11 and, by force of logic, neither does the harmless-error standard. See State v. Smith, 812
P.2d 470,477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("[E]xamin[ing] the affidavit and colloquy together to
determine whether a plea of guilty or no contest has been entered in strict compliance with Rule
11 . . . is not inconsistent with the rejection of the 'record as a whole' approach to Rule 11 in
Gibbons."); State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 775 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("In 1987, the Utah
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Supreme Court rejected the 'record as a whole' test" for assessing Rule 11 compliance."); State
v. Gentry, 191 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("This court has interpreted Gibbons as
effectively replacing the 'record as a whole' test with a strict Rule 1 l([e]) compliance test in
accepting a defendant's guilty plea."); State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah Ct. App.
1988) ("|T]n State v. Gibbons,...

the Utah Supreme Court... effectively replaced the prior

'record as a whole' test with a strict Rule 11(e) compliance test in accepting a defendant's guilty
plea."). Indeed, the court of appeals has carefully cited to language from the Utah Supreme
Court's decision in State v. MacGuire, 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1991) (per curium) (MacGuire I) that
in "'Gibbons, this court adopted a "strict compliance" test which superseded the "record as a
whole" test traditionally applied on review in cases dealing with knowing and voluntary guilty
pleas.'" See State v. Dean, 2002 UT App 323, f 5 n.l (quoting Maguire I, 830 P.2d at 217;,
rev 'd, 2004 UT 63.
However, following the decision in Maguire I, the supreme court accepted "the State's
invitation to discuss more folly the test to be applied in reviewing the validity of a post-Gibbons
guilty plea," State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1992) (Maguire II), and issued its
decision in Maguire II approximately one year later.10 In Maguire II, the supreme court
qualified its per curium holding in Maguire /that the strict compliance test superseded the
"record as a whole" test. The supreme court explained that there is no inherent incompatibility
"between the post-Gibbons 'strict compliance' test and the pxz-Gibbons 'record as a whole' test

The Utah Supreme Court issued Maguire I on July 9, 1991 and it issued Maguire II on April 10, 1992.
Although the two decisions were issued on different dates, they each have the same legal citation.
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for adherence to rule 11 requirements." Maguire II, 830 P.2d at 217. Whether the -pie-Gibbons
"substantial compliance" test applies to a case or the post-Gibbons "strict compliance" test
applies, "[b]oth tests require an appellate court to review the record as a whole, although it is
possible that the definition of the 'record as a whole' under the substantial compliance test might
be broader... than it is under the strict compliance test."11 Id9 at 218 n.l. See also Corwell,
2005 UT 28 at ^[18 ("[T]he test is whether the record adequately supports the district court's
conclusion that the defendant had a conceptual understanding of each of the elements of rule
11(e)." (emphasis added)). Thus, because the "record as a whole" test still applies to rule 11
violations, consistent with the court of appeals position that "[a]s long as the 'record as a whole'
test was used, the harmless error doctrine clearly applied to rule 11 violations," Mora, 2003 UT
App 117 at ^[22 n.4, the harmless error standard should apply to rule 11 challenges.
The court finds that Lovell would have pleaded guilty regardless of the judge's errors.
Lovell's insistence that he would not have pleaded guilty is not credible. Other than Lovell's bald
statement that he would not have pleaded guilty had the trial judge fully informed him of his
rights under rule 11, he provides the court with no concrete evidence demonstrating a reasonable
probability his plea would have been different, or argument demonstrating a reasonable
probability that his plea would have been different had the alleged errors committed by the trial

The supreme court elected not to determine whether, in fact, the record as a whole was more narrow under
the "strict compliance" test than under the "substantial compliance" test See Maguire II, 830 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah
1992).
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judge not occurred.12 On the contrary, Lovell's own statements reveal that pleading guilty is
what he had wanted to do for a long time.13 Lovell agreed that "he wanted to make a clean breast
of this and come forward and . . . ending it so that neither his family or the family of the victim
would have to go through a protracted trial." Def s Plea Colloquy at 10. He acknowledged that
"he concluded on his own and communicated to [Caine] on numerous occasions . . . that he did
not want to go through with the trial process and didn't want to have that happen, given all the
circumstances, and wanted to make an admission before [the trial judge]." Id. at 11. Lovell
further acknowledged that he "has been steadfast in what he wanted to do, at least for the last
three or four months, and has been unwavering in that attitude." Id.
Moreover, it is significant that even though Lovell fully understood that the second plea
agreement did not include a provision for the State to remove the death penalty as a sentencing
option in exchange for a guilty plea, he continued with his desire to plead guilty to aggravated
murder. Indeed, he acknowledged that the idea of pleading guilty, even without the death penalty
being removed as a sentencing option, originated with him. Def s Plea Colloquy at 4-5. It is

Lovell asserts that "he has shown prejudice due to the fact that there is no greater harm [he] can suffer
from the trial court's failure to adequately ascertain that Pie] was giving up the constitutional rights, as outline in
Rule 11, than to be sentenced to death.'" Def s Reply Mem. at 13. However, the applicable prejudice standard is not
whether, but for the trial judge's errors during the plea process, Lovell would have avoided a sentence of death at the
penalty phase, but rather that he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
"Lovell argues in his reply memorandum that when he stated during the plea hearing that he "wanted to do
exactly this for a long time," Tr. of Plea Colloquy at 11, what he meant was that "he wanted to get the remains back
to Ms. Yost's family, not plead guilty and receive the death penalty." Def s Reply Mem. at 5. The context in which
Lovell made his statement simply does not support his position. The entire explanation provided by Caine to the
trial judge, which preceded Lovell's statement, concerned that Lovell was steadfast and unwavering in wanting to
plead guilty. When Caine concluded his comments, the trial judge immediately asked Lovell if what Caine said was
correct. Lovell said, "Yes, sir." The trial judge then asked, "You feel like that's a fair statement of how you feel?,"
and Lovell responded by saying, "Well, I've-I've pretty much wanted to do exactly this for a long time." Tr. of Plea
Colloquy at 11. Clearly, Lovell was referring to pleading guilty and not recovering Ms. Yost's remains.
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difficult to conceive, on the one hand, that Lovell would not be dissuaded from pleading guilty
even though his very life was at stake, while on the other hand, had the trial judge verbally
communicated to Lovell his rights to the presumption of innocence, to compel the attendance of
defense witnesses, and to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury that this would have
caused him to re-think his long-standing and steadfast desire to enter a guilty plea. Furthermore,
Lovell blithely ignores today his confession of murder to Buttars while she was wearing a police
audio-recording device.
Therefore, the court concludes that any error of the trial judge in taking LovelPs plea is
harmless because there is no reasonable probability he would not have pleaded guilty to
aggravated murder, but would have insisted on going to trial. Therefore, even if Lovell had
carried his burden of demonstrating a failure to strictly comply with rule 11, he has failed to
show that this failure affected his decision to plead guilty. Thus, he has not shown good cause to
withdraw his guilty plea under the former version of section 77-13-6 or that his plea was not
knowingly and voluntarily entered under the current version of the statute.
II. The Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Entering a Guilty Plea
The United States Supreme Court has held that "the two-part Strickland v. Washington
test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel." Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). "Under the Strickland test, an individual has been denied the
effective assistance of counsel if: (1) counsel's performance was deficient below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and (2) counsel's performance prejudiced the
defendant." State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, \ 12, 26 P.3d 203. However, as the Supreme Court
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noted in Strickland, "counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and
made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment[,]" Strickland,
466 U.S. at 690, and there is also a "strong presumption" that the outcome of the particular
proceeding is reliable. Id. at 696.
Under the first prong of the Strickland test, an attorney's performance is deficient if he
has "made errors so serious that [he] was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed [a]
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687. The seriousness of any errors is judged by.
whether counsel's representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. Id. at
688. In this context, the "reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially
influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually based,
quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied
by the defendant." Id. at 691. But see Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374,

, 125 S. Ct. 2456,

2466-68 (2005) (holding that even if a defendant in a capital case suggests that no mitigating
evidence is available, trial counsel is required to review material he knows the prosecutor will
rely on as evidence in aggravation). In challenging counsel's effectiveness, a defendant "must
identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable
professional judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances,
the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. In making this determination, fairness requires "that
every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's
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perspective at the time." Id. at 689. Moreover, the assessment of counsel's performance cannot
be based upon "what is prudent or appropriate, but only [upon] what is constitutionally
compelled." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665 n.38 (1984). In addition, the Supreme
Court has specifically noted that,
[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential....
Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge
a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be
considered sound trial strategy."
Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689.
Concerning the second prong of the test, even if a finding is made that an attorney's
representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is meritorious only if "counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance
affected the outcome of the plea process." Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. It is
not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect
on the outcome of the proceeding. Virtually every act or omission of counsel
would meet that test and not every error that conceivably could have influenced
the outcome undermines the reliability of the result of the proceeding.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. Thus, under the second prong of the Strickland test, a defendant
must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."14 Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.

Citing to the case of Kimmelman v. Morrison, All U.S. 365 (1986), the State additionally argues that even
if Lovell is able to show prejudice by demonstrating that he would have insisted on going to trial but for the errors
committed during the plea process, in order for Lovell to be entitled to the relief he seeks, he should also be required
to show added prejudice by demonstrating that he would have had a reasonable probability of success had he actually
gone to trial. The State asserts that unless Lovell can also show that there is a reasonable probability that he would
have been exonerated at trial, allowing him to withdraw his guilty plea under such circumstances *cwould amount to

OQ^^

Memorandum Decision
Case No. 921900407
Page 33
A. Lovell's Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in the Context of His Guilty Plea
Overview of Lovell's Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In addition to the trial judge's failure to strictly comply with rule 11, Lovell also argues
that he is entitled to withdraw his plea because Caine provided ineffective assistance of counsel
and this ultimately lead him to enter a guilty plea unknowingly and involuntarily. According to
Lovell, Caine's "errors in advice foreclosed the option of a trial and further, counsel's assurance
that Judge Taylor would not impose the death penalty, overruled defendant's desire to have a jury
hear the penalty phase of his case." Def s Mem. in Supp. at 4. Lovell asserts that Caine was
ineffective during the plea negotiation process because he either failed to request and failed to
review documents detailing the manner in which Lovell disposed of Ms. Yost's body or, if he did
review these documents, he failed to remember what they said about the manner in which Lovell
had disposed of the body. Lovell continues arguing that had Caine not conducted himself in this
unprofessional manner, he would have been in a position to properly inform Lovell that the
chances of recovering Ms. Yost's body were tenuous at best and, therefore, there was no
sentencing benefit to accepting the plea agreement with the State. As a direct result of Caine's
failure, Lovell contends that he was lead "into accepting a[n] illusory plea deal." Def s Mem. in
Supp. of Mot. to Clarify at 5.
Lovell also argues that Caine provided ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea

the purest promotion of form over substance." State's Mem. in Opp. at 36. Nevertheless, the State also concedes
that the court is bound by precedent and, therefore, this "heightened" prejudice standard is not the standard that must
be applied; it has only been raised to preserve the argument for further review. See Id. at 35 n. 12. The court will
apply the standard mandated by precedent and not address the State's additional prejudice standard.
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negotiation process by allowing law enforcement officers to speak with Lovell about the case
prior to any plea agreement documents being signed and by failing to inform him that any
incriminating statements he might make to investigators or his own family could be used against
him in the event he could not locate Ms. Yost's remains. In addition, Lovell maintains that he
was induced into pleading guilty by Caine's unprofessional advice that the death penalty was
only included in the plea agreement to placate Ms. Yost's family and, more importantly, that if
the jury was waived for the penalty phase, the trial judge would not impose a death sentence.15
According to Lovell, Caine stated that the trial judge had never imposed a death sentence.
Moreover, Lovell alleges that "during [his] initial conversations with [Caine] regarding Judge
Taylor, [Caine] stated [that] once Judge Taylor learned of Ms. Buttars' full knowledge and
involvement, and the fact that she received complete immunity, Judge Taylor would not give
Defendant the death penalty." Def s Mem. in Supp. at 14. Based upon Caine's promise and
representations, Lovell elected to enter into the plea agreement and plead guilty to aggravated
murder even though doing so ostensibly left him exposed to the death penalty. Lovell argues
that, but for Caine's promise, he would not have pleaded guilty. However, when the time came
to question Buttars and expose her participation in the crime, Lovell argues that Caine " failed to
follow through with his commitment to Defendant to ensure Judge Taylor had a complete
understanding of Ms. Buttars' involvement in this matter." Id. Lovell claims that, in light of
15

In support of his argument that Caine made a promise to Lovell that the trial judge would not impose the
death penalty, Lovell points to what he contends is Caine's failure to adequately investigate, prepare, and present
mitigation evidence during the penalty phase of the trial. His argument, apparently, is that Caine's alleged failure in
this regard can only be explained by the firmness with which he believed that the trail judge would not impose a
death sentence upon Lovell. Consistent with this belief, there was little need to perform an extensive mitigation
work-up. See Def s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Clarify at 7.
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Caine's woeful representation, he pleaded guilty to the offense of aggravated murder when he
otherwise would not have. He argues, therefore, that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea on
the ground that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.
B. Lovell's Specific Claims
Lovell raises five16 instances of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel that he asserts
warrant the granting of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea: (1) Caine conducted no formal
discovery; (2) Caine failed to provide proper advice concerning the plea negotiations, including
allowing Lovell to be questioned by law enforcement prior to signing any plea agreement, and he
failed to inform Lovell that statements made to law enforcement in order to comply with the
Memorandum of Understanding could be used against him if Lovell could not locate Ms. Yost's
remains; (3) Caine failed to consider critical evidence relating to how Lovell disposed of Ms.
Yost's body; (4) Caine improperly advised Lovell that Judge Taylor would not impose the death
penalty if he pleaded guilty; and (5) Caine failed to ask Buttars, Lovell's estranged wife,
questions concerning her participation in Ms. Yost's murder.
His other claims, such as Caine's alleged failure in not following ABA guidelines to hire
a psychological expert during the penalty phase, are irrelevant to the motion to withdraw the plea,
but lie more appropriately in the pending rule 65C motion. The court will discuss only those
claims relevant to the motion to withdraw the plea.

As part of his argument that Caine was ineffective, Lovell asserts that the trial judge failed to take any
action on Lovell's letter asking that Caine be fired. See Def s Mem. in Supp. at 9. Because it is not apparent to the
court, and Lovell has not explained, how this particular claim bears upon the issue of whether Caine provided
effective representation, this claim is summarily rejected.
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1. Failure to Perform Formal Discovery
Lovell asserts that Caine provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to conduct
any formal discovery and by relying solely on the open-file policy of the Weber County
Attorney's office. According to Lovell, had Caine conducted formal discovery, Caine would
have been aware of information regarding anonymous tips and a bone fragment related to the
case. He then could have performed further investigation of the case concerning the possibility
of perpetrators other than Lovell. However, as noted by the State, Lovell has not shown that
Caine never received this information, only that he could not specifically recall receiving it
Moreover, Lovell had already divulged to Caine that he had kidnapped and murdered Ms. Yost.
Caine indicated during the evidentiary hearing that, in light of Lovell's taped confession, as well
as the incriminating testimony of Buttars, he did not consider information about other leads
important The court agrees. Indeed, the Strickland decision expressly states that the
"reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the
defendant's own statements or actions.... In particular, what investigation decisions are
reasonable depends critically on such information." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. Even if Caine
had accessed the information set forth above, in light of Lovell's inculpatory statements to Caine
as well as LovelPs surreptitiously recorded confession to Buttars, electing not to pursue an
investigation based upon this information was reasonable. Thus, Lovell has not shown that
Caine's conduct fell below the wide range of professionally competent assistance.
In any event, even if Caine gave deficient representation, Lovell has not shown that the
advice prejudiced him. It is not enough for Lovell to simply state that the "failure to follow up
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on a piece of physical evidence, should be sufficient to meet the prejudice component of the
Strickland test." Def s Mem. in Supp. at 6. Rather, Lovell must show that "there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial." Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. Lovell has not made the required showing, and
he cannot make it either. On the day trial was scheduled to begin, he had been unable to locate
Ms. Yost's body. As a result, consistent with the Memorandum of Understanding, the plea
agreement was void. As a result, Lovell was no longer under any obligation to plead guilty.
Nevertheless, at Lovell's behest, he and the State formulated a new agreement. This plea
agreement provided that Lovell would plead guilty to aggravated murder in exchange for the
dismissal of the aggravated kidnapping charge, but without a withdrawal of the death penalty as a
sentencing option. See Def s Plea Colloquy at 7-8. Thus, notwithstanding that pleading guilty
under the new plea agreement would leave him exposed to the death penalty, Lovell clearly
indicated that he wanted to plead guilty, that it was his decision alone, and that he felt it wras the
right decision for him to make. Indeed, when questioned by the trial judge, Lovell responded by
stating that he had "pretty much wanted to do exactly this for a long time." Id. at 11. In light of
Lovell's steadfastness in wanting to plead guilty at the time of the plea colloquy and his failure in
any way to rebut this evidence, Lovell has not demonstrated prejudice by showing that, but for
Caine's alleged unprofessional conduct, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial.
2. Failure to Provide Proper Advice Concerning the Plea Negotiations
Lovell contends that Caine provided ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea
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negotiation process by directing Lovell to cooperate with law enforcement in finding Ms. Yost's
remains one day prior to signing the Memorandum of Understanding and, moreover, by failing to
inform Lovell that any incriminating statements he might make to law enforcement could be used
against him in the event he could not locate Ms. Yost's body. As a result, Lovell claims that he
made damaging disclosures to law enforcement while being transported to find Ms. Yost's body,
and he did so without the benefit of counsel present. Consequently, he maintains that he
eventually had no alternative but to plead guilty.
First of all, the evidence clearly preponderates that he pleaded guilty for other more
compelling reasons, even assuming he made disclosures to police. Further, if he felt that his
constitutional rights were compromised, he could have filed a motion to suppress any
incriminating statements. He did not. The court rules that this pre-plea constitutional claim is
now waived. But, more fundamentally, the court rules that it does not directly affect whether his
plea was knowing and voluntary, so that he wrongly gave up his right to a trial. Moreover, during
the plea colloquy, when the court discussed his reasons for pleading guilty, he did not state that
his alleged ill-advised admissions had so compromised his case that he had no alternative but to
plead guilty. Rather, he stated that he wanted to pleaded guilty because had wanted to do that for
a long time; he wanted to make a clean breast of things; and he wanted to spare his family and
the Ms. Yost family the ordeal of trial.
Further, Lovell presents no evidence that the State knew about his alleged admissions.
Consequently, he has not proven any prejudice.
Furthermore, that Lovell may have made incriminating statements to law enforcement
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officers while searching for the remains of Ms. Yost one day prior to actually signing the
Memorandum of Understanding does not constitute deficient performance on the part of Caine.
Caine conceded during his testimony that he instructed Lovell to cooperate with law enforcement
the day prior to the Memorandum of Understanding being signed. However, he also testified that
he considered this instruction to Lovell to be contemporaneous with the signing of the document
because the plea agreement with the State had been finalized. Indeed, on June 17,1993, Lovell
in fact signed the Memorandum of Understanding. The court believes that it is not reasonable
that the mere formality of signing the Memorandum of Understanding would have altered in any
way Lovell's conduct or statements had he been directed to cooperate with law enforcement one
day after signing the Memorandum of Understanding. Thus, Lovell has failed to demonstrate
how Caine's advice in this regard fell "below an objective standard of reasonable professional
judgment." Martinez, 2001 UT 12 at^fl2.
The more important issue is Lovell's claim that Caine advised him that any incriminating
information he might provide while cooperating with law enforcement could not be used against
him. Clearly, if Caine so advised Lovell, this would constitute deficient performance under
Strickland. However, the court finds Lovell's claim is not credible. On the other hand, the court
finds Caine highly credible that he expressly told Lovell that anything he said to law enforcement
could be used against him if the plea agreement fell through.
Second, no provision of the plea agreement, under which Lovell initially cooperated with
law enforcement, in any way limited the State's use of information Lovell might provide while
attempting to discover the remains of Ms. Yost. Given Caine's experience as a criminal trial
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attorney, one would expect that such an obviously advantageous provision limiting the State and
favoring Lovell would certainly have been reflected in the language of the written plea
agreement. That no such wording is present is at least indirect evidence that Caine did not tell
Lovell that any incriminating information he might provide while cooperating with law
enforcement could not be used against him. Finally, as the State aptly points out, the record
clearly indicates that Lovell was not truthful for many years about kidnapping, sexually
assaulting, and murdering Ms. Yost. He only began to admit his involvement publically to his
family and investigators after the State secretly recorded his confessions. Apart from this court
judging Caine's veracity over Lovell's at the evidentiary hearing, LovelFs history of untruthful
behavior further warrants discounting his assertion against Caine. For all of these reasons, the
court finds that Caine never advised Lovell that any incriminating information he might provide
while cooperating with law enforcement could not be used against him. Therefore, Caine did not
perform deficiently as Lovell alleges.
Moreover, even if Lovell had demonstrated that Caine's performance was deficient, he
has failed to show that he was prejudiced as a result of this deficiency. Again, in order to show
prejudice, Lovell must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill, M\
U.S. at 59. As explained above, Lovell has not made the required showing. Notwithstanding
that pleading guilty would leave him exposed to the death penalty, Lovell clearly indicated that
had wanted to plead guilty for a long time and that he was pleading guilty in order to spare his
family and Ms. Yost's family the burden of enduring a trial, to make a clean breast of tilings for
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himself, and to admit his involvement to the trial judge. Lovell has failed to rebut in any way his
steadfastness in wanting to plead guilty. Thus, he has not demonstrated prejudice by showing
that, but for Caine's alleged unprofessional conduct, he would not have pleaded guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial.
3. Failure to Consider Critical Evidence
Lovell also argues that Caine was ineffective during the plea negotiation process because
Caine either failed to request and review documents detailing the manner in which Lovell
disposed of Ms. Yost's body or, if he did review these documents, he failed to remember what
they said about the manner in which the body was disposed. Lovell contends that had Caine
conducted himself in a professional manner, he would have been in a position to properly inform
Lovell that the chances of recovering Ms. Yost's body were tenuous at best and, therefore, there
was no sentencing benefit to accepting the plea agreement with the State. As a direct result of
Caine's failure, Lovell argues that he was lead "into accepting a[n] illusory plea deal." Def s
Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Clarify at 5.
Caine testified at the evidentiary hearing that had he known the manner in which Lovell
disposed of Ms. Yost's body at the time he was negotiating the plea agreement with the State, as
set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding, he would have realized that the chances of
Lovell locating Ms. Yost's body were remote and that he likely would not have entered into the
initial plea negotiations with the State. However, the evidence presented at the evidentiary
hearing suggests that statements made by Buttars concerning the manner in which Lovell
disposed of Ms. Yost's body were readily available to Caine and, furthermore, were mentioned in
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documents that Caine contended he had read prior to negotiating with the State.
Nonetheless, Lovell has not shown that Caine performed deficiently. In judging the
effectiveness of Caine's representation, the Strickland standard requires that the "reasonableness
of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own
statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic
choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant." Strickland, 466
U.S. at 691. Caine testified that Lovell assured him that he could find the remains of Ms. Yost in
the dark or even in a blinding snowstorm. According to Caine, on no occasion did Lovell fail to
assure him that he was absolutely certain he could find Ms. Yost's body. As argued by the State,
while it may be true that Buttars' statements cast doubt on Lovell's assurances to Caine, Lovell
provides no argument or authority to suggest that, under prevailing professional norms, Caine
should have accepted Buttars' version of events and discounted Lovell's version. Thus, Lovell
has not shown that Caine represented him in a deficient manner in this regard.
Nevertheless, even assuming that Caine's representation was deficient, Defendant has not
shown that he was prejudiced by this deficiency. When Lovell was unable to fulfill his part of
the plea bargain by failing to located the remains of Ms. Yost, the plea agreement as set forth in
the Memorandum of Understanding failed on its own terms; it was void. As such, Lovell was
free to go to trial. Instead, he chose to negotiate a new plea agreement, embodied in the plea
statement, and to enter a guilty plea under that agreement. Thus, even if Caine performed
deficiently in negotiating the initial plea agreement, based upon Lovell's assurances, that has no
bearing upon the subsequent plea agreement contained in the Plea Statement and on which
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Lovell actually based his guilty plea. Therefore, because Lovell did not plead guilty based upon
the plea agreement contained in the Memorandum of Understanding, he has not demonstrated
that Caine's alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to that plea agreement probably
would have altered the outcome of the plea-taking process. Moreover, as previously explained,
Lovell has not, and likely cannot, demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."
Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. For these reasons, Lovell has not shown that Caine's alleged ineffective
assistance resulted in prejudice.
4. Promising Lovell that Judge Taylor Would Not Impose the Death Penalty
Lovell also contends that Caine led him to plead guilty to aggravated murder based upon
unprofessional, and ultimately false, advice Caine gave him. Lovell alleges that Caine told him
that the death penalty remained a sentencing option in the plea agreement only to placate Ms.
Yost's family. Moreover, Caine promised him that Judge Taylor would not impose a death
sentence if Lovell waived the jury for the penalty phase. Based upon Caine's promise, Lovell
contends he elected to enter into a plea agreement with the State and plead guilty to aggravated
murder, even though doing so clearly left him exposed to the death penalty. According to Lovell,
but for Caine's guarantee he would not have pleaded guilty to aggravated murder.
A promisefroma trial attorney to his client in a capital case that the trial judge would not
impose a death sentence if the client waived the jury for the penalty phase would certainly
constitute deficient performance under Strickland. However, the court finds no credible evidence
that Caine gave such promise to Lovell. Caine testified that, given the egregious circumstances
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of the homicide and other facts related to the case, such as Lovell's attempts to hire others to kill
Ms. Yost and his confession that he killed her himself, he believed that if the penalty phase were
tried to a jury there was a significant probability that Lovell would receive a death sentence. In
light of this belief, Caine considered the alternative of waiving the jury and having the trial judge
determine the appropriate sentence. After consulting with other experienced attorneys, all of
whom agreed that the jury should be waived, Caine advised Lovell that, in his professional
opinion, Judge Taylor would not impose a sentence of death and, therefore, it would be to
Lovell's advantage to waive the jury for the penalty phase. He expressed his professional opinion
that a jury would give him a death sentence, especially with his confession.
Several circumstances convince the court that Caine gave no promise or guarantee to
Lovell but only his professional opinion that the trial judge would not impose the death penalty.
First, Caine testified that he gave Lovell only his best professional opinion; he made no promises
or guarantees to Lovell. Judging the veracity of both Caine and Lovell, as they both testified at
the evidentiary hearing, the court finds Caine's testimony highly credible and Lovell's testimony
not believable. Caine is now, and was at the time he represented Lovell, a highly experienced
and respected criminal lawyer and capital homicide defender in the State of Utah. At the time of
representing Lovell, Caine had experience with 10 to 15 capital cases. That Caine would promise
or guarantee what Judge Taylor, or any judge for that matter, would do at sentencing strains
credulity.
Second, when the trial judge inquired of Lovell during the plea colloquy whether
"anybody, anyone at all, [had] made any kind of promise to you about something that would
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happen other than what we've talked about here in open court," Def s Plea Colloquy at 8, Lovell
expressly stated "no." Third, Lovell's own word usage in his original pro se motion to withdraw
his guilty plea belies his present, self-serving testimony. There Lovell stated:
I wanted all along to have a jury hear the penalty hearing and not you, cause I felt I
had a much better chance with a jury to receive a life sentence. [Caine] talked me
into going with you because he said he doufbjted that you would or could give me
the death penalty-He was wrong! (Emphasis added.)
Def s Pro Se Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea (emphasis added). Lovell does not say that Caine
"promised" or "guaranteed" him that the trial judge would not impose the death penalty; rather,
he expressly indicates that Caine "doubted" that the trial judge would impose a sentence of death.
This language is inconsistent with Lovell's later testimony at the evidentiary hearing, and further
corroborates Caine" s testimony that in giving advice to Lovell, he expressed only his best
professional judgment but gave no promises or guarantees.
Fourth, following the guilty plea and scheduling of dates for the penalty phase, a
discussion ensued in open court concerning the statute under which Lovell would be sentenced.
See Def s Plea Colloquy at 31-34. During this discussion, Caine explained to the court that at the
time Lovell murdered Ms. Yost, the sentencing options available under the capital sentencing
statute were only death and life with the possibility of parole. He further explained, however,
that the current statute in effect included the additional sentencing option of life in prison without
parole. Thus, Lovell had the choice of proceeding under the old statute with the two sentencing
options, or the new statute with the three sentencing options. When the trial judge asked Lovell
which statute he desired to be sentenced under, Lovell stated, "I'll take the three options." Id at
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34.
The court believes that this choice is revealing as to what Caine had represented to
Lovell. Had Caine actually promised Lovell that the trial judge would not impose the death
penalty, as Lovell claims, the rational choice for Lovell at sentencing would have been to be
sentenced under the old statute. By removing the death penalty under Lovell's claim of a
guarantee leaves the judge with only the sentence of life with the possibility of parole left. This is
Loveil's best chance at sentencing. On the other hand, if one is really worrying about the
imposition of the death penalty, because there is no promise of what the judge will do at
sentencing, the two-option alternative may not be attractive because the judge may not want to
give Lovell a chance at parole under the heinous circumstances of this case. But if there is no
promise of what the judge may do at sentencing, then the sentencing scheme with "three options"
potentially leaves the sentencing judge with a wider choice of punishment and the option of
imposing life in prison with no possibility of parole in lieu of death. It is reasonable that Lovell
thoughtfully chose the sentencing scheme of three options, after previous consultation with Caine
in which Caine had expressed only his opinion or best professional judgment, because he wanted
to make it easier for Judge Taylor to give him life in prison rather than the death penalty.
Finally, Lovell testified at the evidentiary hearing that Caine told him that once ihe initial
plea agreement was in place, any incriminating statements he made to law enforcement as part of
efforts to comply with the conditions of the agreement, particularly in relation to locating Ms.
Yost's body, could not be used against him in any future proceedings in the case if the plea
agreement fell through. However, after the plea agreement fell through, Lovell contends that
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Caine informed him that his statements could be used against him. On the basis of this alleged
misrepresentation, Lovell alleges he sought to have Caine removedfromthe case. This claim is
suspect to the court because if, in fact, Caine misrepresented to Lovell about the use of his
incriminating statements in future proceedings, it appears unusual, at best, for Lovell to then
believe Caine's assurances regarding what Judge Taylor might do at sentencing, involving life or
death.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the court finds Caine did not promise Lovell that the trial
judge would not impose the death penalty, but only gave Lovell his professional opinion.
Accordingly, he has failed to show that Caine's representation was deficient. Moreover, for
reasons previously stated, even if Caine did provide deficient representation, Lovell has faired to
satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland by showing that "there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial." Hill A1A U.S. at 59.
5. Failing to Sufficiently Question Rhonda Buttars
In his last claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Lovell alleges that "during [his]
initial conversations with [Caine] regarding Judge Taylor, [Caine] stated [that] once Judge Taylor
learned of Ms. Buttars' full knowledge and involvement, and the fact that she received complete
immunity, Judge Taylor would not give Defendant the death penalty." Def s Mem. in Supp. at
14. However, when the time came to question Buttars and expose her participation in the crime
and her dealings with the State, Lovell contends that Caine "failed to follow through with his
commitment to . . . ensure Judge Taylor had a complete understanding of Ms. Buttars'
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involvement in this matter." Id. Lovell argues that, but for Caine's unprofessional advice and
subsequent failure to thoroughly question Buttars, he would not have pleaded guilty or, at the
least, would have demanded a jury during the penalty phase.
First, at issue is whether this court should allow Lovell to withdraw his guilty plea, not
whether Caine failed to adequately represent him during the post-plea penalty phase of the case.
That claim more appropriately lies in Lovell's pending rule 65C motion for ineffective assistance
of counsel in the sentencing hearing. For these reasons, the court rejects Lovell's ineffectiveness
claim with respect to Caine's alleged failure during the plea-taking process. The court holds that
Lovell's argument is non sequitur. An alleged post-plea failure of counsel during the penalty
phase of the case cannot be the basis of a pre-plea claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that
undermines a knowing and voluntary guilty plea.
Nevertheless, in case the supreme court sees this issue differently, this court finds and
concludes that Lovell has not carried his burden under Strickland. First, the court finds that Caine
never made the promise to call Buttars in the fashion Lovell maintains. Second, even if Caine did
make this representation, Lovell does not assert that Caine promised or guaranteed that Judge
Taylor would not impose a death sentence if Buttars' participation in the crime was folly
revealed. At best, Caine simply revealed a strategy for the penalty phase and his professional
opinion about what he thought might be the result if he implemented that strategy. That Caine
later changed his mind for other strategic reasons, which he explained at the evidentiary hearing,
does not warrant the conclusion that Caine performed deficiently. Formulating such a strategy
would constitute deficient performance only if the strategy bore no reasonable relationship to the
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objective of avoiding the imposition of the death penalty.
Finally, if Lovell were truly induced into pleading guilty based upon the assurance that
Judge Taylor would not impose the death penalty if Buttars' participation in the crime and her
dealings with the State were fully revealed, then, in light of the alleged lack of questioning on the
part of Caine, Lovell surely would have taken the opportunity to more fully explain Buttars'
participation to Judge Taylor when Lovell testified at the penalty phase. Lovell did not, however.
The record persuades the court that Lovell desired to plead guilty because he knew he
would be convicted if his case went to trial, he wanted to spare his family and Ms. Yost's family
the anguish of sitting through a murder trial, and he wanted to make a clean breast of things and
admit his guilt to Judge Taylor. For these reasons, even if the court concludes that Caine did
make the representation Lovell alleges he made regarding Buttars, he has not shown that this
constituted deficient performance and, therefore, that Caine provided ineffective assistance of
counsel.
CONCLUSION
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure imposes a burden on trial judges to
ensure that every defendant understands his or her constitutional and rule 11(e) rights and
protections before entering a guilty plea. This burden is a duty of strict compliance. Lovell
contends that the trial judge failed to strictly comply with rule 11 before accepting his guilty plea
to aggravated murder. The court disagrees.
Using defense counsel's written plea statement and his own plea colloquy, the trial judge
covered with Lovell all of his rights except his rights to the presumption of innocence, to compel
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the attendance of defense witnesses, and to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury.
Nonetheless, the record as a whole shows that Lovell's experience in the criminal justice system
and his own involvement in his murder case amply communicated to him the meaning of these
expressly omitted rights. As such, he has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence
that he did not understand his rights under rule 11. Therefore, he is not entitled to withdraw his
guilty plea under a standard of good cause governing in 1993, when he filed his motion to
withdraw his plea, or under a standard of a knowing and voluntary plea governing today. Indeed,
the record persuades the court that Lovell had a conceptual understanding of each element of rule
11, as required by law, and, accordingly, the court concludes that strict compliance with rule 11
occurred for a valid and binding guilty plea.
Even if Lovell had demonstrated that the trial judge did not strictly comply with rule 11 at
the time he pleaded guilty, he has not shown that the trial judge's errors prejudiced him. While
the Utah Court of Appeals has held that a trial court shall presume prejudice against a defendant
for a trial judge's failure to strictly comply with rule 11, neither that court nor the Utah Supreme
Court has directly addressed whether this presumption of harm is conclusive or rebuttable.
Today, this court rules as a matter of law that a conclusive presumption applies only if a judge's
error in not informing a defendant of his constitutional and rule 11(e) rights necessarily results in
the defendant being unaware that he is waiving his rights when he pleads guilty. In other words,
if a defendant were otherwise aware of rights that the judge neglected to review with him, then
the presumption of prejudice is rebutted. Accordingly, the court further denies Lovell's motion to
vacate his guilty plea merely because the trial judge inadvertently omitted expressly discussing
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certain rights of which Lovell was already aware and understood. Technicalities will not prevail
o i ;rcr substance in this case.
In addition to concluding today that the record rebuts any presumed preji idice to I ^ ;rell
from errors of the trial judge in the plea-taking process, the court further rules as a matter of law
that any error of I In; liial jiml^e is ulso suhjci 1 lo a harmless-error standard re\ icw usually
reserved for errors raised for the first time on appeal. The harm contemplated under the harmless: standard is whether the error affected the outcome of the plea proceeding. Rule 30(a) of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure states that "[a]ny error, delect, irregularly or viin-ince \\ Inch «Iocs
not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded."
In th is case, I ovell ha s not sho\:v n that, In it for the trial judge's errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty in any event. Other than Lovell's bald statement that he would not have pleaded
guilty had the trial judge fully informed him of all of hisrightsunder rule 11, he provides no
concrete evidence demonstrating a reasonable probabilit)' his pica would have been different, On
the contrary, his specific reasons given to the trial judge for pleading guilty provide very
persuasive reasons for wanting to nuke a dean breast of things loi a long time. He also blithely
ignores today his confession of murder to his estranged wife while she was wearing a police
.. u' -wording device. Therefore, the court concludes that any error of the trial judge in taking
Loveil's plea is harmless because there is no reasonable probability tha t those ei rors "w oi lid have
changed the outcome. The evidence persuades the court that Lovell would have pleaded guilty
anyway.
In addition to his claim that the trial judge failed to strictly comply with rule i i
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also argues that he is entitled to withdraw his plea because Caine provided ineffective assistance
of counsel and this ultimately lead him to enter a guilty plea unknowingly and involuntarily. He
raises five specific instances of ineffective assistance of counsel that warrant setting aside the
plea. In each instance, the court finds that Lovell has failed to overcome the strong presumption
that Caine's representation fell within "the wide range of professionally competent assistance."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Moreover, even if Lovell had shown that Caine acted
unprofessionally, he has not demonstrated prejudice, namely, that "there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial." Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. Thus, Lovell has not shown that he is entitled to
withdraw his guilty plea based upon any alleged ineffective representation of counsel during the
plea-taking process.
Order
Therefore, based on the foregoing findings and conclusions of law, the court denies
Loveil's original and renewed motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Dated this

h

day of October, 2006.

Michael D. Lyon, Judge /
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